Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Mitchell Hamline Open Access
Faculty Scholarship

2008

Without a Doubt, A Sharp and Radical Departure:
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision to
Change Plain Error Review of Unobjected-To
Prosecutorial Error in State v. Ramsey
James Morrow
Mitchell Hamline School of Law, james.morrow@mitchellhamline.edu

Joshua R. Larson

Publication Information
31 Hamline Law Review 353 (2008)
Repository Citation
Morrow, James and Larson, Joshua R., "Without a Doubt, A Sharp and Radical Departure: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision
to Change Plain Error Review of Unobjected-To Prosecutorial Error in State v. Ramsey" (2008). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 313.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/313

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Mitchell Hamline
Open Access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by
an authorized administrator of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more
information, please contact sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.

Without a Doubt, A Sharp and Radical Departure: The Minnesota
Supreme Court’s Decision to Change Plain Error Review of UnobjectedTo Prosecutorial Error in State v. Ramsey
Keywords

Preservation of issues for appeal (Law), Judicial error, Objections (Evidence)
Disciplines

Criminal Procedure

This article is available at Mitchell Hamline Open Access: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/facsch/313

WITHOUT A DOUBT, A SHARP AND RADICAL
DEPARTURE: THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION TO CHANGE PLAIN ERROR REVIEW OF
UNOBJECTED-TO PROSECUTORIAL ERROR IN
STATE V. RAMEY
TABLE OF CONTENTS

II.

Ill.

INTRODUCTION

353

SUMMARY OF STATE V. RAMEY

359

A. FACTS
B. THE FIRST MINNESOTA COURT OFAPPEALS DECISION
C. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT DECISION
1. THE MAJORITY OPINION
2. THE CONCURRING OPINIONS

359
360
361
361
366

ANALYSIS

369

A.

THE RULES DEFINING PROSECUTORIAL VOUCHING ARE
NOT CLEAR
1. THE BASIC DISTINCTION BETWEEN "VIGOROUSLY
ARGUING CREDIBILITY" AND VOUCHING
a. CASES EXEMPLIFYING "VIGOROUSLYARGUING
CREDIBILITY"
b. CASES EXEMPLIFYING "VOUCHING" IN
CLOSING ARGUMENT
2. CASES THAT BLUR THE LINE BETWEEN "VIGOROUSLY
ARGUING CREDIBILITY" AND "VOUCHING"
a. THE "BELIEVABLE PERSON" CONTEXT
b. THE "HE LIED" OR "SHE TOLD THE TRUTH"

CONTEXT

B.
C.
D.

c. THE "I THINK" CONTEXT
3. CONCLUSION ON THE CLARITY OF WHAT
CONSTITUTES VOUCHING
RAMEY JEOPARDIZES THE TRIAL COURT'S ABILITY TO
REMEDY THE EFFECTSOF PROSECUTORIAL ERROR
RAMEY CONTRADICTS THE IDEALS OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE
TERM "PROSECUTORIAL ERROR"

369
371
372

373
375
376
380
381
385
386
393
395

IV.

A REPRISE: THE REMANDED RAMEY

400

V.

CONCLUSION

402

2008]

PROSECUTORIAL ERROR

WITHOUT A DOUBT, A SHARP AND RADICAL
DEPARTURE: THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT'S
DECISION TO CHANGE PLAIN ERROR REVIEW OF
UNOBJECTED-TO PROSECUTORIAL ERROR IN
STATE V. RAMEY
James A. Morrow andJoshua R. Larson1
In other men we faults can spy,
And blame the mote that dims their eye,
Each little speck and blemish find,
To our own [plain] errors blind.2
I. INTRODUCTION
To err is human, and to err in a courtroom is inevitable. Prosecutorial
error is an unfortunate aspect of the criminal justice system. Prosecutors are
obligated to ensure that criminal defendants receive fair trials 3 and are
expected to be aware of and comply with case law which clearly and
consistently outlines the rules that guarantee defendants a fair trial.4 At the
same time, defense attorneys are obligated to object to prosecutorial error
when it occurs and seek corrective action by the trial court.5 Ideally, a
prosecutor would never err, but, if he or she did err, the defense attorney
would object and the trial court would remedy any prejudicial effect or grant
a mistrial if the error could not be cured.

Jim Morrow is a Senior Fellow and Professor of Law at Hamline University
School of Law and a senior Minnesota district court judge. Joshua Larson received his Juris
Doctor from Hamline University School of Law, May 2008, and is a law clerk for the
Minnesota Court of Appeals during the 2008-2009 term. The authors wish to thank Rachel
Morrison, Staff Attorney for the 10th Judicial District, Minn.; Mark Metz, Assistant Carver
County Attorney (Minn.); Chief Judge Bill Johnson for the 3rd Judicial District, Minn.;
Professors Peter Thompson, Marie Failinger, Joe Daly, Mary Jane Morrison, and Edwin
Butterfoss, Professors at Hamline University School of Law; and the Hamline Law Review
staff for their assistance. This article exchanges the word "error" for the word "misconduct" in
all but direct quotations. The readers should know, however, that courts in Minnesota at this
time use the word "misconduct" to refer to any errors committed by a prosecutor, regardless
of how sli ht or unintentional. See infra Part l.D.
John Gay, The Turkey and the Ant, in FABLES: WITH A MEMOIR BY AuSTIN
DOBSON 98,98 (Kessinger Publ'g 2007) (1727).
3
State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2006) (citing State v. Henderson,
620 N.W.2d 688, 701-02 (Minn. 2001) and State v. Sha, 193 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Minn. 1972)).
Note, however, that "the Constitution guarantees a fair trial - not a perfect or error-free trial."
State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 513 (Minn. 2006) (citing State v. Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d
488, 505 (Minn. 1999)); see also State v. Martin, 723 N.W.2d 613, 626 (Minn. 2006).
4
Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 301.
5
Id. at 303.
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When a defense attorney does not make a specific and timely
objection 6 to a prosecutor's error, her failure to object implies that the error
was not prejudicial, 7 and she "generally forfeits the right to have [the error]
considered on appeal." 8 The defendant still may appeal based on that error; 9
however, if the appellate court opts to review the claim, the standard
generally used to review claims of unobjected-to prosecutorial error, namely
"plain error review," has a high threshold of persuasion that makes it difficult
for defendants to prevail on appeal.' 0 Under plain error review, if a
prosecutor commits an error at trial and the defendant does not object to it,
the defendant later may ask the appellate court to order a new trial, but the
court will do so only if the error was plain, the error affected the defendant's
substantial rights,'1 i.e., the right to a fair trial, 12 and the court determines that
"it should address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial
proceedings."' 3 Furthermore, until recently, Minnesota courts handled the
6

MINN.

R. EvID. 103(a)(1).

Rule 103. Rulings on Evidence
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling
which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is
affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence a timely
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground
of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context ....
Id.

See, e.g., State v. Parker, 353 N.W.2d 122, 128 (Minn. 1984) (finding
defendant's "failure to object to the prosecutor's statements implies that the comments were
not prejudicial.").
8
State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 375 (Minn. 2005) (citing State v. Sanders,
598 N.W.2d 650, 656 (Minn. 1999)); see also MtNN. R. EvID. 103(d) (stating that, without a
proper objection, the court may take notice of only "errors in fundamental law or of plain
errors affecting substantial rights").
9
State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 297-98 (Minn. 2006).
10 Id. at 298-99; see also State v. Pilot, 595 N.W.2d 511,518 (Minn. 1999).
This is a standard with a high thresholdof persuasion: the trial error must
have been so clear under applicable law at the time of conviction, and so
prejudicial to the defendant's right to a fair trial, that the defendant's
failure to object - and thereby present the trial court with an opportunity to
avoid prejudice - should not forfeit his right to a remedy.
Id. (citing Rairdon v. State, 557 N.W.2d 318, 323 (Minn. 1996)) (emphasis added).
II See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 300 (describing the test for reviewing unobjected-to
prosecutorial misconduct); see also State v. Powers, 654 N.W.2d 667, 678 (Minn. 2003)
(identifying, based on the seriousness of the prosecutorial misconduct, two distinct standards
for reviewing whether the defendant's right to a fair trial was impaired); State v. Wahlberg,
296 N.W.2d 408, 420 (Minn. 1980) (observing that reversal is warranted only where
misconduct, "viewed in the light of the whole record, appears to be inexcusable and so serious
and prejudicial" that the defendant was denied the right to a fair trial).
12 See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 300. The court uses the phrase "the defendant's
substantial rights" but explains the meaning of that concept by stating that "[t]he overarching
concern is that [prosecutorial] misconduct may deny the defendant's right to a fair trial." Id.
13 Id. at 298 (citing State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998)). The
court normally described the plain error test as having "three prongs," in that "there must be
(1) error; (2) that is plain; and (3) the error must affect substantial rights." See id. To date, the
7
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burden of proof on claims of unobjected-to prosecutorial error in the same
way federal and most state courts around the country handle it, by placing
the entire burden of proof on the defendant. 14 Federal courts apply Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) 15 when addressing claims of unobjected-to
prosecutorial error. 16 The majority of state courts which apply plain error
court has not explained whether the plain error test is better characterized as a four-prong test,
with the fourth prong being a requirement that the appellate court find a reason to "address the
error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings." See id; see also State v.
Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 508 (Minn. 2006).
If the three prongs of the plain error test are met, we will then assess
whether we should address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of
the judicial proceedings. "We will correct the error only if the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings is seriously
affected."
Id. (citing State v. Morton, 701 N.W.2d 225, 234 (Minn. 2005)).
14
See, e.g., People v. Washington, No. 03CA1895, 2007 WL 1557923, at *16
(Colo. App. May 31, 2007) (stating that defendant has the burden of establishing plain error
through the following factors: "the severity and frequency of the misconduct, any curative
measures taken to alleviate the misconduct, and the likelihood that the misconduct constituted
a material factor leading to [the] defendant's conviction"); State v. D'Haity, 914 A.2d 570,
578-79 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that the defendant has the burden and that "the
touchstone for appellate review of claims of [unobjected-to] prosecutorial misconduct is a
determination of whether the defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial"); People v.
Sullivan, 853 N.E.2d 754, 769 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (applying plain error, stating that the
defendant must establish that prosecutorial misconduct "resulted in substantial prejudice to the
accused and, absent the remarks, the verdict would have been different"); People v. Benoit,
No.246512, 2004 WL 915084, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2004) (stating the defendant
must show unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct was plain error affecting the defendant's
substantial rights); State v. Barnett, 980 S.W.2d 297, 306 (Mo. 1998) (implying that the
reviewing court will only partake in a plain error review if the defendant demonstrates that the
prosecutor's statements resulted in "manifest injustice"); Hernandez v. State, 50 P.3d 1100,
1108-09 (Nev. 2002) (stating that the court may review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct if
the defendant can show it was plain error that affected the defendant's substantial rights);
State v. Muhle, 737 N.W.2d 647, 657 (N.D. 2007) (stating the defendant has the burden of
establishing the existence of a plain error by establishing that there was an "(1) error, (2) that
is plain, and (3) affects substantial rights"); State v. Jones, 744 N.E.2d 1163, 1182 (Ohio
2001) (holding that where the defendant fails to object to prosecutorial misconduct, the
defendant waives all but plain error and cannot prevail unless the defendant demonstrates that
but for the prosecutor's misconduct the outcome of trial would have been different); State v.
Bolen, 632 S.E.2d 922, 928 (W. Va. 2006) (stating that with regard to unobjected-to errors,
the defendant must establish that the error was plain and affected the defendant's substantial
rights); Lancaster v. State, 43 P.3d 80, 94 (Wyo. 2002) (applying plain error rule, stating that
the defendant has the burden of showing that the "record clearly reflects an error that
transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law, and that such error materially prejudiced a
substantial right").
'"
FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Plain Error. A plain error that affects substantial rights
may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention.").
16 See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 498 F.3d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating
that, for reversal, there first must be "(1) 'error,' (2) that is 'plain,' and (3) that 'affect[s]
substantial rights') (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)); United
States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 358 (5th Cir. 2007) ("Improper prosecutorial comments
constitute reversible error only where the defendant's right to a fair trial is substantially
affected."); United States v. O'Keefe, 461 F.3d 1338, 1350 (11th Cir. 2006) ("We will reverse
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require the defendant to show that the error was plain-or "clearly contrary
to the law"17-and that the error was so prejudicial that it denied the
defendant his or her right to a fair trial."8
a defendant's conviction on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct only where the prosecutor's
'remarks (1) were improper and (2) prejudiced the defendant's substantive rights."') (quoting
United States v. Hernandez, 145 F.3d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Combs,
379 F.3d 564, 568 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that, under the plain error standard, a defendant
must prove (1) there was error; (2) the error was plain; and (3) the error affected substantial
rights); United States v. Venable, 269 F.3d 1086, 1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying plain
error doctrine under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) to claim on unobjected-to
prosecutorial misconduct, placing the burden of persuasion for each element on the
defendant); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 406 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying plain
error doctrine under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) to claim on unobjected-to
prosecutorial misconduct, placing the burden of persuasion for each element on the
defendant); Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1250 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that the court
reviews allegedly improper prosecutorial misconduct to determine whether it "so infected the
trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process") (citation
omitted); United States v. Hopkins, No. 94-1337, 1995 WL 70162, at *3 (1st Cir. Feb. 22,
1995) (applying the plain error standard of review to unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct
and stating that the court "will reverse only if the error seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings, or where a miscarriage of justice has
occurred"); United States v. Karam, 37 F.3d 1280, 1289 (8th Cir. 1994) ("In evaluating
allegations of prosecutorial misconduct alleging improper statements during closing argument,
this court asks: (1) whether the prosecutor's comments were improper; and (2) if so, did such
remarks prejudicially affect the defendant's substantial rights in obtaining a fair trial.");
United States v. Moore, 11 F.3d 475,481 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying plain error to unobjected-to
prosecutorial misconduct, finding that, though the prosecutor's description of the defendants
as "liars" was plain, reversal was not required since defendant failed to establish that his
substantial rights were affected); United States v. Harrison, 716 F.2d 1050, 1052 (4th Cir.
1983) (stating that one factor the court looks to when examining claims of prosecutorial
misconduct is the degree to which the prosecutor's remarks have a tendency to mislead the
jury and toprejudice the accused).
State v. Johnson, 699 N.W.2d 335, 340 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting
Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)); see also State v. Dobbins, 725
N.W.2d 492, 513 (Minn. 2006) (stating an error is plain if it is "clearly contrary to the law").
18 See, e.g., Ward v. State, 765 So. 2d 299, 301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that where the defendant fails to object to prosecutorial error the court must
determine whether fundamental error occurred); State v. Iuli, 65 P.3d 143, 151 (Haw. 2003)
(stating that where a defendant fails to object to a prosecutor's statement during closing
argument, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the prosecutor's alleged
misconduct amounted to plain error that affected the substantial rights of the defendant); State
v. Sheahan, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (Idaho 2003) (stating that a conviction will be set aside for
prosecutorial misconduct only when the conduct results in fundamental error such that the
conduct was "calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or prejudice against
the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on
factors outside the evidence"); State v. Broyles, 36 P.3d 259, 264 (Kan. 2001) (stating that the
court's standard of review of prosecutorial misconduct, whether objected-to or unobjected-to,
is whether the claimed error is determined to have implicated the defendant's right to a fair
trial); State v. Powers, 654 N.W.2d 667, 678 (Minn. 2003) (stating that if the defendant fails
to object to prosecutorial misconduct at trial, the defendant forfeits the right to have the issue
heard on appeal unless "the error is sufficient"); State v. Barfield, 723 N.W.2d 303, 312 (Neb.
2006) (applying plain error review of unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct, and finding
plain error when the error "prejudicially affects a litigant's substantial rights"); State v.
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However, in September 2006, the Minnesota Supreme Court altered
the test used to review claims of unobjected-to prosecutorial error in State v.
Ramey.1 9 The majority in Ramey chose to alter the test to "better allow
substantive [appellate] review of conduct that prosecutors should know is
clearly forbidden and to put the onus on the prosecution to defend against the
prejudicial effect of its own misconduct. 2 ° Specifically, the majority shifted
the burden of proof with regard to claims of unobjected-to prosecutorial error
by holding that the defendant need only establish plain error. The state can
avoid retrial only by proving a negative, that the error did not affect the
defendant's right to a fair trial.2'
The shifting of this burden of proof prompted sharp criticism from22
concurring Justices Paul Anderson, G. Barry Anderson and Lorie Gildea
and made Ramey a controversial case among practitioners. There are several
serious problems with Ramey, and this article will address four of them.
First, the majority in Ramey relied on an erroneous assumption,
namely that the Minnesota Supreme Court cases defining prosecutorial error
are clear and obvious.2 3 Under the majority's reasoning, the increased threat
of reversal would compel prosecutors to follow the court's rules, and, thus,
presumably, prosecutors would reduce their incidents of error. 24 A review of
Minnesota Supreme Court precedent-at least with regard to prosecutorial
vouching in closing argument, the error that seemed to raise the majority's
ire in Ramey-shows a confusing, contradictory jurisprudence.
Second, despite holding that the trial court is in the best position to
"attempt to remedy the effects of [prosecutorial error], 25 the majority has
jeopardized the ability of trial courts to remedy unfair prejudice when it
Gonzales, 817 P.2d 1186, 1192 (N.M. 1991) (holding that unobjected-to prosecutorial
misconduct is reviewed for fundamental error and will be deemed harmless only if there is no
reasonable probability that the misconduct did not contribute to the conviction); Powell v.
State, 995 P.2d 510, 536-39 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000) (holding that unobjected-to prosecutorial
misconduct is reviewed for plain error and whether the error had a substantial influence on the
outcome of trial); State v. Humphrey, Nos. 53155-7-I, 53065-8-1, 2004 WL 2526545, at *6
(Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2004) ("A defendant who fails to object to an improper remark
waives the right to assert prosecutorial misconduct unless the remark was so flagrant and ill
intentioned that it caused enduring and resulting prejudice that a curative instruction could not
have remedied.").
19
State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 300 (Minn. 2006).
20
Id.
21
Id. at 296.
22
See id. at 303 (P. Anderson, J., concurring); id. at 304-07 (Gildea, J.,
concurring, joined by G.B. Anderson, J.).
23
See infra Part Im.A; see also Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 299-300, 301-02 (majority
opinion). The Ramey Court "expect[s] that prosecutors . . . are aware of [its] case law
proscribing particular conduct as well as the standards of conduct prescribed by the ABA,"
and, with its decision in Ramey, aimed to prevent "conduct that prosecutors should know is
clearly forbidden." Id. (emphasis added). "An error is plain if it was 'clear' or 'obvious."'
State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 688 (Minn. 2002).
24
State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 301-03 (Minn. 2006).
25
Id. at 299.

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

occurs by providing an incentive to defense attorneys to remain silent when
prosecutors commit prosecutorial error. 26 Typically, jurors view their trial
judge with great deference, and a judge's influence over jurors provides the
judge with a remarkable ability to remedy unfair prejudice.27 The Ramey
holding diminishes the contemporaneous objection rule, which states that a
failure to make a specific and timely objection to an error forfeits
consideration of the error on appeal.28 Ramey also affects the neutrality of
trial court judges, who now must second-guess omitted objections by defense
counsel. As a result, it seems likely that appellate courts will hear more
appeals based on unobjected-to error. Such a result runs counter to the
Minnesota Rules of Evidence and the fundamental principles of the jury
system.
Third, Ramey contradicts the ideals of judicial restraint. 29 The
majority's decision to abandon precedent and shift the crucial burden of
proof in the plain error test from the defendant to the prosecutor was made
without the benefit of any briefs on the issue, any oral arguments on the
issue, or any model from any other jurisdictions.
Fourth, the Ramey majority's use of the term "prosecutorial
misconduct" is problematic and misleading. 30 Following the sound reasoning
of the Connecticut Supreme Court, 3' many other state courts,32 and a
proposal by the Minnesota County Attorneys Association, 3 this article
recommends that the court reserve the term "prosecutorial misconduct" to
refer only to improper acts that are intentional and deliberate and that the
court use the term "prosecutorial error" for those errors that are unintentional
or innocuous. To flesh out the distinction between error and misconduct, this
article refers to several Minnesota Supreme Court cases from 1921 to 1966
that exemplify prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument.
The article concludes by stating that the Minnesota Supreme Court
should reinstate the State v. Griller test for unobjected-to prosecutorial
error, 34 placing the burden solely on the defendant, consistent with prior
Minnesota precedent, most of the other state courts, the Federal Circuits, and
the United States Supreme Court.35 Assuming Ramey remains the law, a
See infra Part II.B.
Judge Morrow has found this to be true in his more than twenty-four years of
experience on the bench and as an educator of new and experienced trial judges.
28
See State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2001); see also MINN. R. EvID.
103.
29
See infra Part ImI.C.
3' See infra PartlH.D.
31 See State v. Fauci, 917 A.2d 978, 982 n.2 (Conn. 2007).
32
See infra note 293 and accompanying text.
33
John Kingrey, Minnesota County Attorneys Assoc., Memorandum on
Prosecutorial Error Recommendation (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.mcaa-mn.org/docs/2007/
Prosecutorial%20Error%2OMemo5-17-07.doc.
34
See State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998).
31
See infra Part V.
26
27
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better way for the court to reduce prosecutorial error is to use its opinions to
develop clearer distinctions between improper and proper argument.3 6
H1. SUMMARY OF STATE V. RAMEY
A. Facts
In February 2003, Sherry Smith obtained an order for protection
against the defendant, Scott Ramey, as a result of the defendant's multiple
unwanted attempts to contact her.37 On April 8, 2003, Ramey entered
Smith's bedroom and awakened her by kissing her. 38 Smith phoned the
police to report the incident and was informed that Ramey had not yet been
served with the order. 39 Ramey returned to Smith's residence again that
evening, and Smith phoned 911.40 The police arrived and served Ramey with
the order for protection, which advised Ramey that he was prohibited from
contacting Smith in any way. 4' Later that same day, Smith received a phone
call from Ramey at her workplace.42 After a few seconds, Smith hung up and
phoned the police, and Ramey was arrested.43
Ramey was charged with felony violation of an order for protection
under Minnesota Statute § 518B.01, subdivision 14(d)(1) due to previous
convictions related to domestic violence. 44 At trial, Smith testified about the
call and identified the defendant as the caller. 45 Ramey did not testify. 46 The
jury convicted Ramey of violating the order for protection.47 The district
court sentenced Ramey to "a stayed commitment of 21 months and a
partially stayed $3000 fine, plus completion of a domestic abuse or anger
management program." 4 Ramey appealed his conviction to the Minnesota
Court of Appeals. 9

See infra Part V.
State v. Ramey, No. A04-1056, 2005 WL 832054, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
12, 2005), rev'd, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006).
38
Id.
39 Id.
36

37

40

Id.

41

Id.
Id.

42

43 State v. Ramey, No. A04-1056, 2005 WL 832054, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
12, 2005), rev'd, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006).
44
Id.; MIm.STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 14(d)(1) (2003).
45 Ramey, 2005 WL 832054, at *1.
46
47
48
49

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. The First Minnesota Court of Appeals Decision
The defendant raised two issues on appeal.50 First, he claimed that
the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury that it should
not draw any adverse inference from the defendant's decision not to testify
without first obtaining the defendant's request or consent. 5' Second, the
defendant claimed that the prosecutor committed "prosecutorial
misconduct'52 when the prosecutor made four statements in closing
argument 53 that, according to the defendant, "improperly interjected the
state's opinion and improperly vouched for witnesses." 54 The statements
were as follows:
(1)
The State charged Mr. Ramey, entered this trial
believing he's guilty.
That would be a big coincidence if it wasn't the
(2)
defendant, and the State believes that would be too big of a
coincidence. The State believes that's too big of a bridge to
jump.
The State believes [the victim's] testimony is
(3)
credible. The officer[s'] testimony is credible and you
should believe what they told you.
(4)
We suggest there [is] no evidence that you can find
that [the victim] was somehow affected, that she couldn't
have - couldn't have accurately identified Ramey's voice. 55
The defense attorney did not object to any of these statements at trial.56
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding
that the defendant was denied a fair trial because the no-adverse-inference
instruction was plain error and the prosecutor's comments were error that
worked in concert with the erroneous instruction to "substantially influence
[] the jury to convict. 5 7 In reviewing the alleged prosecutorial error, the
Id. at **1-2; see also State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 297 n.1 (Minn. 2006).
State v. Ramey, No. A04-1056, 2005 WL 832054, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
12, 2005), rev'd, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006). The judge received the defense counsel's
consent, but the judge did not obtain the defendant's personal consent on the record. Id.
Minnesota law states that it is error to give the instruction without the defendant's consent. Id.
(citing State v. Darris, 648 N.W.2d 232, 240 (Minn. 2002); McCollum v. State, 640 N.W.2d
610, 617 (Minn. 2002); MINN. STAT. § 611.11 (2002)).
50
51

52

Id.

53 See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 297 n.1. Subsequent to its 2005 decision and the

Minnesota Supreme Court's 2006 Ramey decision, the court of appeals determined that the
first of these four statements had been made in the State's opening statement-not the closing
argument. See State v. Ramey, No. A04-1056, 2007 WL 1247145, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. May

1,2007).
m4 State v. Ramey, No. A04-1056, 2005 WL 832054, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
12, 2005), rev'd, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006).
55 Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 297 n.1.
56
Ramey, 2005 WL 832054, at *2.
17 Id. at *3.
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court of appeals applied a two-tiered approach that the Minnesota Supreme
Court created in State v. Caron.58 Caron stated:
The test of determining whether prosecutorial misconduct
was harmless depends partly upon the type of misconduct
with which we are dealing. That is, the more serious the
misconduct, the more certain of its effect this court has felt
that it should be before labeling the error harmless. Thus, in
cases involving unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct
this court has required certainty beyond a reasonable doubt
that the misconduct was harmless before affirming .... On
the other hand, in cases involving less serious prosecutorial
misconduct this court has applied the test of whether the
misconduct likely played a substantial part in influencing the
jury to convict.59
The court of appeals in Ramey determined that the alleged "prosecutorial
misconduct" was "less serious" but did not clarify whether the prosecutor's
statements alone would have demanded reversal. 60 The court held only that a
new trial was necessary because the conviction was substantially influenced
by the erroneous jury instruction and improper statements.61
The State petitioned the Minnesota Supreme Court for review,
claiming the court of appeals erred in applying the two-tiered Caron analysis
to Ramey's claim of prosecutorial error because Ramey had not objected to
the alleged error.62 The State argued that, in applying Caron's "substantial
influence on the conviction" test, the court of appeals failed to review the
alleged unobjected-to error according to Minnesota Supreme Court
precedent, which demanded the "plain error" standard of review.63
C. The Minnesota Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed to review the case to clarify
"(1) whether the plain error doctrine applies to unobjected-to prosecutorial
misconduct," and (2) what legal standard should be applied to determine
whether the alleged error is prejudicial. 64 The State asked the court to apply
the plain error test, which had been applied to most claims of unobjected-to
prosecutorial error since the court established the Griller test in 1998.65 On
58

59
60
61
62
63

64
65

Id. at *2; see also State v. Caron, 218 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn. 1974).
Caron,218 N.W.2d at 200.
Ramey, 2005 WL 832054, at *2-3.
See id. at *3.
State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 296 (Minn. 2006).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 301.
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the other hand, the defendant asked the court to apply a harmless-beyond-areasonable-doubt standard when assessing prejudice. 66 It is surprising,
considering the court's ultimate ruling, that neither party briefed the idea of
shifting the burden in the plain error test to the state 7 and that neither of the
parties nor any of the justices raised the issue of shifting the burden or
proposed such a remedy at oral argument.6
Since the 1980s, the Minnesota Supreme Court has not applied a
consistent standard for analyzing claims of unobjected-to prosecutorial
error. 69 The Ramey majority stated that the court oscillated between plainerror review and the two-tiered "Caron standard," sometimes applying one
and sometimes applying the other, 70 and apparently settled on plain-error
review within the previous eight years. 71 After weighing the merits of the
different standards, the majority went on to hold that, in cases involving
72
unobjected-to prosecutorial error, the Caron standard would be abandoned
in favor of the plain-error doctrine, which requires reversal only when there
is a clear or obvious error that affects the defendant's right to a fair trial.73
According to the court, plain error review is useful because it strikes a
suitable balance between encouraging defendants to object at trial74 and
6
67

id.
See Appellant's Brief and Appendix, State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn.

2006) (No. A04-1056), 2005 WL 4829521 (arguing in favor of applying the Griller plainerror test for unobjected-to prosecutorial error without suggesting or addressing the possibility
of shifting the burden of proof); Respondent's Brief, State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn.
2006) (No. A04-1056), 2005 WL 4859274 (asking the court to reject plain-error analysis and
apply a harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard); Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 303 (P.
Anderson, J., concurring).
(' See
Minnesota
Supreme
Court
Oral
Arguments
Videos,
http://www.tpt.org/courts/ (search for case "A04-1056," follow "State v. Ramey" hyperlink).
69 Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 298. The Caron standard requires that
in cases involving unusually serious prosecutorial misconduct, the Court
[had to find] certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that the misconduct was
harmless before affirming . . . [and], in cases involving less serious
prosecutorial misconduct [the] court [had to find that] ... the misconduct
likely played a substantial part in influencing the jury to convict.
Id. (citing State v. Caron, 218 N.W.2d 197, 200 (Minn. 1974)). For cases of unobjected-to
prosecutorial error, the Caron standard made it difficult for a defendant to succeed on appeal
because the court held that a defendant's "failure to object to the prosecutor's statements
implies that the comments were not prejudicial." See, e.g., State v. Parker, 353 N.W.2d 122,
128 (Minn. 1984).
70 Id. at 298; see, e.g., State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740-41 (Minn. 1998)
(clarifying State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Minn. 1984), which applied the Caron
standard); State v. Atkins, 355 N.W.2d 410, 411 (Minn. 1984) (discussing the plain error
doctrine); State v. Bland, 337 N.W.2d 378, 384 (Minn. 1983) (discussing the plain error
doctrine).
71 State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294,298 (Minn. 2006).
72
Id. at 300.
71 Id. at 299.
74 Id. at 298-99 ("When a defendant does not make a contemporaneous objection,
the district court does not have the opportunity to rule on the misconduct or make a
determination as to whether a corrective instruction is required or appropriate.").
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"tempers the blow of a rigid application of the contemporaneous-objection
requirement." 75 Plain error review also has a basis in the Minnesota Rules of
Criminal Procedure 76 and is designed to carefully balance the desire to police
"obvious injustice" against the "need to encourage all trial participants to
seek a fair and accurate trial the first time. ' 7
After describing the plain error doctrine as defined by Griller,78 the
majority noted that it did not wish to follow Griller completely when
examining prosecutorial error.79 Under Griller,the defendant bears the entire
burden of proving that (1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the
defendant's substantial rights were prejudiced. 80 The court decided that since
prosecutorial error recently had become significantly more troubling,
defendants should not be forced to bear the entire burden of proof when
raising claims of unobjected-to prosecutorial error. 81 Instead, the court held
that if a defendant's claim is related to unobjected-to prosecutorial error, the
defendant must demonstrate only that the prosecutor committed an error and
that the error was plain, clear or obvious.82 If the defendant is successful in
demonstrating plain error, the burden-apparently a heavy burden-shifts to
the state to prove a negative, that the error did not affect his substantial
rights.83
75

Id. at 299 (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)).

76

Id. at 297 (citing MINN. R. CRIM. P. 31.02, which states, "Plain errors or

defects affecting substantial rights may be considered... on appeal although they were not
brought to the attention of the trial court.").
77
State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Minn. 2006) (quoting United States v.
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982)).
78
Id. at 298-99 (citing State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998)).
79
Id. at 299-300.
8o Id. at 300 (citing Griller,583 N.W.2d at 741).
81
Id. Apparently, the court felt that it was more troubling that other types of
unobjected-to error receive standard plain error review. See, e.g., Griller,583 N.W.2d at 740
(improper jury instructions); State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 582-83 (Minn. 2005)
(hearsay); Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d 465, 475-76 (Minn. 2004) (Confrontation Clause
violations); State v. Manley, 664 N.W.2d 275, 283 (Minn. 2003) (failure to provide a limited
instruction); State v. Asfeld, 662 N.W.2d 534, 540 (Minn. 2003) (references to past domestic
abuse); State v. Budreau, 641 N.W.2d 919, 925 (Minn. 2002) (references to past murders);
State v. Lee, 645 N.W.2d 459, 466-67 (Minn. 2002) (improper admission of evidence
regarding relationship with victim); State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 685 (Minn. 2001)
(improper Spreigl testimony); State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 363 (Minn. 1999) (improper
expert testimony); State v. Patterson, 587 N.W.2d 45, 52 (Minn. 1998) (narrative testimony).
82
Ramey, 294 N.W.2d at 302; see also State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 688
(Minn. 2002) ("An error is plain if it was 'clear' or 'obvious."').
83
State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 299-300 (Minn. 2006) ("[W]hen
prosecutorial misconduct reaches the level of plain or obvious error - conduct the prosecutor
should know is improper - the prosecution should bear the burden of demonstrating that its
misconduct did not prejudice the defendant's substantial rights."). The court explained that the
state would meet its burden if it could show that there is no reasonable likelihood that the
absence of the misconduct in question would have had a significant effect on the verdict of the
jury. Id. at 302. Previously, the court has characterized the third prong as a "heavy burden" to
satisfy, State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998), with a "high threshold of
persuasion," State v. Pilot, 595 N.W.2d 511, 518 (Minn. 1999).
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To understand the majority's reasoning, it is important to note that
the majority dedicated most of its opinion to addressing the frequency of
cases involving alleged prosecutorial error.84 Starting with a laundry list of
eight types of improper prosecutorial conduct that the court reviewed since
1984,85 the majority explained that, from its perspective, prosecutors
repeatedly and knowingly engage in conduct that is obviously
impermissible 86 despite the fact that they are "officer[s] of the court" and
"minister[s] of justice," charged with the affirmative obligation to attain
justice. 7 According to the majority, such impermissible conduct from
prosecutors is intolerable because the court's jurisprudence provides
prosecutors the clear opportunity to know when their actions are improper.8 8
The court concluded that plain error review under Griller lacks a sufficient
intimidating effect to keep prosecutors from violating the law and that
changing the appellate standard of review was necessary to restore and
protect the "fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." 9
In contrast to the court's lengthy discussion of prosecutorial error,
the court spent very little time citing case law that compelled its decision to
shift the burden of proof.9° In fact, the majority's opinion surprisingly cited
only three cases, all from other jurisdictions, to justify and support its
holding. 9' The majority cited California v. Chapman, a case in which the
United States Supreme Court held that constitutional error can be harmless.92
In Chapman, the Court placed the burden on "the beneficiary of the error
84

Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 301.

85

Id. at 300.

We have identified numerous kinds of trial conduct that are improper for
prosecutors. Some examples are: eliciting inadmissible evidence; alluding
in argument to the defendant's exercise of the right not to testify, or to the
defendant's failure to call witnesses; misstating the presumption of
innocence, or the burden of proof; interjecting the prosecutor's personal
opinion about the veracity of witnesses; inflaming the passions and
prejudices of the jury; disparaging the defendant's defense to the charges;
and injecting race into the case when race is not relevant.
Id. at 300 (citations omitted).
86
Id. at 299-300, 302.
87
Id. at 300; see also State v. Henderson, 620 N.W.2d 688, 701-02 (Minn. 2001)
(providing prosecutors have an affirmative obligation to ensure that a defendant receives a fair

trial).

88 Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 299-302. The Ramey court "expect[s] that prosecutors.
are aware of [its] case law proscribing particular conduct as well as the standards of conduct
prescribed by the ABA," and, with its decision in Ramey, aimed to prevent "conduct that
prosecutors should know is clearlyforbidden." Id. at 301-02 (emphasis added).
89
See id. at 302 (stating that, even when all three prongs of the plain error test are
satisfied, the court makes a fourth determination, namely, whether the error should be
addressed to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings); see also State v.
MacLennan, 702 N.W.2d 219, 235 (Minn. 2005).
90 See State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006).
91 Id. at 302 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
92 Id.
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either to prove that there was no injury or to suffer a reversal of his
erroneously obtained judgment., 93 The majority also cited court of appeals
cases from Alabama94 and Wisconsin 95 that placed the burden on the
prosecution to show that prosecutorial error did not have a constitutionally
impermissible effect on the defendant's rights.96 None of these three cases
was discussed by the Ramey parties in their briefs, and the
court provided the
97
parties no opportunity to address them in oral argument.
As for the majority's ultimate justification for its decision, it shied
away from claiming that its holding was compelled by legal precedent and,
instead, simply referenced its duty to supervise the trial courts and its desire
to regulate "impermissible practices. 9 8 The majority wrote:
When there is no objection and the misconduct is plain,
placing the burden on the prosecution to show lack of
prejudice will allow for more effective appellate regulation
of impermissible practices. Appellate Courts should "not
hesitate in a suitable case to grant relief in the form of a new
trial." For our part, we retain the authority in the appropriate
case to reverse under our supervisory powers, without regard
to whether the defendant was prejudiced. Therefore, we
reverse and remand to the court of appeals to determine
whether the prosecutor's conduct constituted plain error and
to place the burden on the prosecution to show lack of
prejudice. 99
The majority provided very little explanation of how it saw its new
standard of review actually improving the conduct of prosecutors.' °° By
requiring the state to show that the defendant's substantial rights were not
affected by any prosecutorial plain errors, the court suggested only that it
would "put the onus on the prosecutor" and remind prosecutors that
"[lreducing the incidence of prosecutorial misconduct is [their] shared
obligation."' 0 ' Ultimately, according to the court, such pressure could curb
Id. (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).
Wilson v. State, 874 So. 2d 1155, 1159 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (holding state
must establish that prosecutorial error did not injuriously affect defendant's substantial rights).
95
State v. King, 555 N.W.2d 189, 194 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that, under
the state's plain-error rule, burden is on the prosecution to prove that plain error is harmless);
see also State v. Mayo, 734 N.W.2d 115, 123 (Wis. 2007) (citing King, 555 N.W.2d at 194)
("The burden is on the State to prove that [a] plain error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.").
96
See State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 303 (Minn. 2006).
97
See Appellant's Brief and Appendix, Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 (No. A04-1056),
2005 WL 4829521; Respondent's Brief, Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 (No. A04-1056), 2005 WL
4859274; Minnesota Supreme Court Oral Arguments - Videos, supra note 68.
98
See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 303.
99 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Glaze, 452 N.W.2d 655, 662 (Minn.
1990).
'0o See id. at 301-03.
'0' Id. at 302-03.
93

94
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what the court saw as prosecutors' unrelenting engagement in "clearly
prohibited1 2conduct" in the face of decades of judicial effort to prevent such
injustice.

0

2. The ConcurringOpinions
Ramey was technically a 7-0 decision because all seven justices
agreed that the court of appeals applied the wrong standard of review to the
alleged prosecutorial error. However, only four justices signed the majority
opinion, and three justices sharply criticized the majority's holding in two
concurring opinions written by Justices Paul Anderson and Lorie Gildea
respectively.
Justice Lorie Gildea, with Justice G. Barry Anderson joining her,
confronted the majority on multiple fronts.10 3 Justice Gildea's first criticism
concerned the majority's assault on stare decisis. 1°4 Justice Gildea
emphasized that stare decisis is a fundamental principle of Minnesota
Supreme Court doctrine' 0 5 that provides stability in the law and is "not to be
abandoned on a whim."' 6 She quoted the Minnesota Supreme Court's 1956
decision in Fosterv. Naftalin, in which the court stated:
Government by law instead of by man, which is the main
bulwark to our democratic form of government, demands a
decent respect for the rule of stare decisis in order that
citizens of this state will be assured that decisions of 10the
7
court are good for more than "one trip and one day only."'
She noted that, though the court should not be completely inflexible, the
court should be "extremely reluctant to overrule [its] precedent"' 8 and is
supposed to "require... a 'compelling reason' to overrule [its] precedent."'1 9
She then explained that "the majority's new plain error formulation . . .

'w

Id. at 301.

Our new approach of shifting the burden to the prosecution to show lack
of prejudice in prosecutorial misconduct cases best serves policy
concerns. The benefits of this approach are to better allow substantive
review of conduct that prosecutors should know is clearly forbidden and
to put the onus on the prosecution to defend against the prejudicial effect
of its own misconduct. A further benefit of this approach is to provide
more scrutinizing review by the court of appeals, where a large majority
of prosecutorial misconduct appeals are decided.
Id. at 302.
103 Id. at 304-07 (Gildea, J., concurring).
104 State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 304 (Minn. 2006) (Gildea, J., concurring).
105 Id.
106 Id. (quoting Zettler v. Ventura, 649 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 2002) (R.
Anderson, J., dissenting)) (noting that "[w]hile the doctrine of stare decisis is not inflexible, it
is not to be abandoned on a whim; its purpose is to provide stability in the law .... ).
17 Id. (citing State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 74 N.W.2d 249, 264 (Minn. 1956)).
1(8 Id. (quoting State v. Lee, 706 N.W.2d 491, 494 (Minn. 2005)).
09 Id. (quoting Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Minn. 2000)).
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ignores the doctrine of stare decisis and creates unprecedented new law
without compelling reason."'"1 Justice Gildea stated:
The majority's decision abandons our doctrine of stare
decisis, creates instability in the law, rewrites our court rule,
and overrules recent cases, all without compelling reason to
do so .... Just how placing the burden on the prosecution
will deter misconduct the majority does not say. In any
event, the majority's speculative hoped-for outcome does
not constitute a compelling reason to depart from
precedent." 1
Justice Gildea did agree with the majority that "prosecutorial error is a
serious issue."' " 12 Nevertheless, Justice Gildea disagreed that this was a
compelling reason to change the law.13
Justice Gildea's second criticism was that the majority's approach is
"at odds" with the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure.' 14 Rule 31 of the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure contains language identical to the
language in Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.1 15 It forms
the procedural basis for both harmless error and plain error analysis. 11 6 In
regard to plain error, Rule 31.02 states, "[pilain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be considered by the court upon motions for new trial,
post-trial motions, and on appeal although they were not brought to the
attention of the trial court."' 1 7 Justice Gildea pointed out that when the
United States Supreme Court analyzed this language in the "identical"
Federal Rule in United States v. Olano," 8 the Court determined that under
the plain error analysis the defendant must bear the burden of proof because
the rule authorizes a remedy only if the error affects substantial rights." 9
Justice Gildea explained:
Because Rule 31.02 permits an appellate court to consider
unpreserved error only if the error does affect substantial
110

State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 304 (Minn. 2006) (Gildea, J., concurring).

.. Id. at 304-06.
12 Id. at 306.
113
Id. Justice Gildea stated that the "problem of prosecutorial misconduct is better
dealt with through the efforts of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility than
through a rejection of our precedent." Id.
4
"
Id. at 304.
15
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993) (citing FED. R. CRim. P.
52); see also Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 304 ("Our Rule 31.02 contains the identical language and
indeed our rule is based on the federal rule.").
16 MINN. R. CRIM. P. 31.
17 Id. at 31.02 (emphasis added to show that, under the rule, the court
may
exercise its discretion to not consider an unobjected-to plain error). Contrast this language
with Rule 31.01, which states in regard to harmless error, "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." Id. at 31.01.
"' FED. R. Cum4. P. 52(b).
119 State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 304-07 (Gildea, J., concurring) (citing
Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35).
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rights, it is logical to place the burden of persuasion on the
defendant to show the error did affect substantial rights and not on the state to prove the negative. This is the
approach we have taken in our cases since the development
of the plain error doctrine in Minnesota.
In essence, the majority's result rewrites Rule 31.02.
In my view, we should not rewrite our court rules in specific
cases, as the majority does here, especially when the issue
was not briefed. We have a process for revision of court
rules, and20that process should be followed before rules are
changed.1

Justice Gildea concluded that the court should have retained its original
Griller
formulation for plain error in cases of unobjected-to prosecutorial
12 1
error.

Justice Gildea's third criticism is that the cases cited by the majority
to support its holding are "inapposite within the context of the plain error
analysis."'' 22 Justice Gildea noted that two cases cited by the majority place
the burden on the state in the context of a harmless error analysis, 23 which,
as the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure illustrate and Justice Gildea
explained, is inapplicable to plain error analysis. 24 Justice Gildea criticized
the majority's reliance on the third case, State v. King, with equal force,
noting that, in King, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals explicitly rejected the
U.S. Supreme Court's formulation of the plain error doctrine. 125 "The same
authority that Wisconsin rejects is the very foundation for [the Minnesota
126
Supreme Court's] formulation of the plain error doctrine in Minnesota.',
Justice Paul Anderson also criticized the majority opinion. His first
criticism touched on the court's "imprudent... burden-shifting change" and
120

Id. at 305 & n.7 (original emphasis omitted) (emphasis added).

121 Id. at 307.
122
123

124

Id. at 306.
Id.
Id.

125 State v.Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 306 (Minn. 2006) (Gildea, J., concurring).

The majority also cites a Wisconsin case, which appears to use a
harmless error analysis "in determining whether to invoke the plain error
doctrine," and places the burden on the state to show that the error was
harmless. State v. King, 205 Wis.2d 81, 555 N.W.2d 189, 194 (1996)
("[W]hen constitutional errors are involved and plain error is alleged, the
state has the burden to show that the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt."). That case explicitly recognizes that its holding is
inconsistent with the relevant United States Supreme Court authority on
the issue. Id. ("This conclusion is inconsistent with Olano, in which the
Supreme Court concluded that under the plain error doctrine, 'It is the
defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion
with respect to prejudice."').
Id.

126

Id.; see also State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998).
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abandonment of precedent. 27 Justice Anderson characterized Ramey by
stating that, "[w]ithout a doubt, the majority's holding represents a sharp and
radical departure - a 180 degree turn - from our court's and the United States
Supreme Court's jurisprudence as to the burden of persuasion on the third
prong of the plain error test."1 28 Justice Anderson stated that the court should
have "adhered to well-established 129
precedent and the guidance provided by
the United States Supreme Court."'
Justice Anderson's second criticism focused on the majority's
judicial philosophy, or, as he put it, "how we as an appellate court go about
doing our business." 130 Justice Anderson wrote:
I am concerned with our court making such a sharp
departure from precedent when the concept of shifting the
burden of persuasion was not fully developed 3 ' in the
parties' briefs or orally argued before our court, and does not
have well-developed case law to support it. . . . I would
much prefer an approach whereby, in the context of this
issue in this case, we adhere to our well-established
precedent, but in the majority or by concurrence or dissent
signal that we invite arguments in the future that specifically
address this issue. Under such circumstances, we would
have the benefit of well-developed arguments, could
properly evaluate the merits132 of each side's argument, and
could then decide this issue.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Rules Defining Prosecutorial Vouching Are Not Clear
The Ramey majority's decision is based on an opinion that
prosecutors have received clear instruction from the court on what
constitutes impermissible conduct. 133 The specific type of prosecutorial error
at issue in Ramey is prosecutorial vouching. 134 Vouching occurs when the
prosecutor personally endorses the credibility of the state's witnesses in
closing argument. 35 The defendant's appeal and the court of appeals'
127

Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 303-304 (P. Anderson, J., concurring).
Id. at 303.
129
Id. at 304.
130 Id. at 303.
131 Id. (emphasis added). Justice Paul Anderson's statement that neither party
"fully developed" the concept of burden-shifting implies that one of the parties at least
mentioned the issue. However, the authors' careful review of the appellate briefs and oral
arguments reveals that the concept was not briefed or argued orally.
132 Id. at 303-04.
133 State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 300-01 (Minn. 2006) (majority opinion).
128

131

Id.
S34atinfra
297 Part
n.A1.
See
IIII.A. Lb.
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reversal were based in part on the notion that the prosecutor improperly
vouched for the credibility of the State's witnesses. 36 Additionally, the
Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion in Ramey was provoked by the
defendant's vouching claim. 137 It was the alleged vouching in Ramey-taken
in the context of the court's perceived prosecutorial error epidemic-that led
the majority to establish higher appellate scrutiny in cases of unobjected-to
prosecutorial error.' 38 It seems 39helpful, then, to review the court's
jurisprudence related to vouching. 1
Certainly, there are multiple secondary sources 4° and primary case
law from other jurisdictions' 41 that discuss vouching. However, no source is
more authoritative or important to Minnesota's jurisprudence than the court's
own words.' 42 The fundamental question is: Has the Minnesota Supreme
Court clearly defined improper prosecutorial vouching to the degree
suggested by the majority in Ramey?
136

Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 297.

137

Id.
Id. at 299-302.
Focusing on vouching also seems appropriate because, as every experienced

138
139

trial attorney knows, cases usually rise and fall on the credibility of witnesses; this is why
most closing arguments focus on witness credibility.
140 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION,
Standard 3-5.8(b) (1993), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjustlstandards/pfunctoc.html ('The prosecutor should not express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the
truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant."); Phil Carruthers et
al., Prosecutorial Misconduct (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.mcaa-mn.orgldocs/2007/
ProsecError-Phil-9-14-06.pdf; William B. Johnson, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial
Effect of Comments by Counsel Vouching for Credibility of Witnesses, 45 A.L.R.4th 602
(1986); James H. Kaster, ProsecutorialMisconduct in Closing Argument: Part 1,MINN. TRIAL
LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 12, 15; JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 9.19 (3d
ed. 2003); Henry Blaine Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations on the
Prosecutor'sClosing Argument, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 33-35 (1973).
141 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Guizar, 160 F.3d 511, 520-21 (9th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Molina-Guevara, 96 F.3d 698, 704 (3d Cir. 1996); United States v. Manning,
23 F.3d 570, 575 (1st Cir. 1994); Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 951 (11th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1178-80 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749,
756-57 (6th Cit. 1979); United States v. Ludwig, 508 F.2d 140, 142-43 (10th Cir. 1974);
Gradsky v. United States, 373 F.2d 706, 709-11 (5th Cir. 1967). It is common for sources
from different jurisdictions to contradict one another on this issue. Compare, e.g., State v.
Draize, 276 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Wis. 1979) ("The prosecutor may comment on the evidence,
detail the evidence, argue from it to a conclusion and state that the evidence convinces him
and should convince the jurors") (quotations omitted) (emphasis added), with Modica, 663
F.2d at 1178 (explaining why prosecutors are proscribed from stating their personal opinions).
142 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 140, at Standard
3-1.1.
These standards are intended to be used as a guide to professional conduct
and performance. They are not intended to be used as criteria for the
judicial evaluation of alleged misconduct of the prosecutor to determine
the validity of a conviction. They may or may not be relevant in such
judicial evaluation, depending upon all the circumstances.
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The Basic DistinctionBetween "Vigorously Arguing Credibility"
and Vouching

Although the trial court instructs jurors that they are the sole judges
of the credibility of witnesses, 43 a prosecutor has an opportunity to face the
jurors during closing argument and "may argue that particular witnesses
were or were not credible."' 144 Moreover, a prosecutor has a right to argue
that the state's witnesses were worthy of credibility. 45 In addition, in State v.
Googins, the court held that a prosecutor has "a right to analyze the evidence
and vigorously argue that the state's witnesses were worthy of credibility
whereas [the] defendant and his witnesses were not."'146 The court has held
that, "[iln closing arguments, counsel has the right to present to the jury all
legitimate arguments on the evidence [and] to analyze and explain the
evidence."' 47 The court also has held that "prosecutors are given considerable
latitude during final argument and that they are not required to make a
colorless argument."1 48 The court is supposed to look at a closing argument
"as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken
49
out of context or given undue prominence."'
At the same time, Minnesota Supreme Court precedent also
establishes that prosecutors cannot personally endorse the credibility of the
state's witnesses, express personal opinions as to the credibility of witnesses,

143 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES - CRIMINAL 3.12 (5th ed.

2006) (instructing jurors that they are the sole judges of whether witnesses are to be believed
and informing them about what factors they make take into consideration when judging
credibility). Jurors are told that they may take into consideration a witness's credibility based
on several factors, including (1) interest or lack of interest in the outcome of the case; (2)
relationship to the parties; (3) ability and opportunity to know, remember, and relate the facts;
(4) manner; (5) age and experience; (6) frankness and sincerity or lack thereof; (7)
reasonableness of their testimony in light of all the other evidence in the case; (8) any
impeachment of the witness's testimony; and (9) and any other factors that bear on
believability and weight. Id.
14 See State v. Lopez-Rios, 669 N.W.2d 603, 614 (Minn. 2003).
145
State v. Googins, 255 N.W.2d 805, 806 (Minn. 1977); see also State v. Yang,
627 N.W.2d 666, 679 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
146 Googins, 255 N.W.2d at 806 (emphasis added); see also State v. Booker, 348
N.W.2d 753, 755 (Minn. 1984) (stating "the prosecutor had a right to urge the jury to consider
defendant's interest in the outcome in assessing his credibility") (citing City of St. Paul v.
Willier, 231 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1975)).
147 State v. Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 1996) (citing State v. Wahlberg,
296 N.W.2d 408, 419 (Minn. 1980)); see also State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 799 (Minn.
2000) (holding that a prosecutor may offer an interpretation of the evidence but may not offer
a personal opinion as to the defendant's guilt).
'4 State v. Ives, 568 N.W.2d 710, 714 n.1 (Minn. 1997) (citing Smith, 541
N.W.2d at 589); State v. Atkins, 543 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Minn. 1996).
149 State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn. 1993) (citing Booker, 348
N.W.2d at 755).
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or even impliedly guarantee the truthfulness of witnesses. 50 These
impermissible practices are generally referred to as "vouching."' 55 For over
fifty years, the court has stated that a prosecutor's personal opinion regarding
the credibility of particular witnesses is unacceptable and that a prosecutor
"may not throw onto the scales of credibility the weight of his own personal
opinion."'152 Therefore, while an attorney may argue a particular witness's
credibility, the attorney may not interject his or her personal opinion so as to
"'personally attach' . . . himself or herself to the cause which he or she
represents."'' 53 The prosecutor may "offer . . . an interpretation of the
evidence [but not] a personal opinion as to guilt.' ' 154 The Minnesota Supreme
rule" helps prevent "exploitation
Court has found that this "personal opinion' 55
of the influence of the prosecutor's office."'
These rules imply that there is a group of permissible practices called
"arguing credibility" or "interpreting the evidence" and that there is a group
of impermissible practices called "vouching" or "providing personal
opinions." Yet, without consistent, clear examples of each group, even a
diligent prosecutor, in preparing for or in the heat of final argument, could
err in arguing credibility. A review of Minnesota Supreme Court cases
should at least put prosecutors on notice of what they can and cannot do
when addressing jurors in closing argument. Ultimately, the cases fail to do
this.
a. Cases Exemplifying "Vigorously Arguing Credibility"
The court has identified when a prosecutor is "arguing credibility."
For example, in State v. Jackson, the court held that the prosecutor did not
engage in impermissible vouching when he said:
You must ask yourselves what had Alaiena Charlton and
Alonna Charlton or even Michael McCaskel or Stephens
Wilburn to gain by testifying here. They know what a snitch
is. They know what happens to snitches. They know how
blood [sic] gang members deal with snitches ....Make no
150 See State v. Patterson, 577 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Minn. 1998); State v. Porter, 526

N.W.2d 359, 364 (Minn. 1995).
151 See, e.g., Patterson,577 N.W.2d at 497.
152 State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 516 (Minn. 1984); see also State v. Schwartz,
122 N.W.2d 769 (Minn. 1963) (reversed where prosecutor asserted that he was "satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt" by the evidence); State v. Cole, 59 N.W.2d 919, 922 (Minn.
1953); State v. Gulbrandsen, 57 N.W.2d 419, 622 (Minn. 1953).
153 Ture v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. 2004) (quoting State v. Everett, 472
N.W.2d 864, 870 (Minn. 1991)).
'-4 State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 799 (Minn. 2000) (holding that the
prosecutor did not improperly offer her personal opinion when she stated: "I submit to you
[Overall] was killed by her partner ...").
Everett, 472 N.W.2d at 870 (citing ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
15
PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.8(b) and Commentary (1979)).
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mistake, members of the jury, what interest do they have in
the outcome of this
case? By testifying they have absolutely
56
nothing to gain.
Ten years earlier in State v. Smith, the court held that the prosecutor was
merely trying to establish the credibility of the State's witnesses when the
prosecutor stated:
Mr. White [who was a witness for the state] is in prison. Do
you know what happens to people who testify against other
people in prison? . . . But for some reason each of them
found a level of humanity in their hearts which allowed
them, in some small way, to sacrifice their own personal
57
well-being for what they considered to be a larger issue.1
Earlier yet in State v. Everett, the court held that the prosecutor did not vouch
for a state's witness when the prosecutor told the jury:
You saw him, as he testified in this courtroom, his mild
manner, his voice so low that you could barely hear it. Judge
his demeanor, he is not a cold blooded executioner, he was
in that cab, he saw what happened and he told you what
158
happened when he came into this courtroom and testified.
The court found the prosecutors' closing arguments in these cases
were permissible. A reasonable conclusion to draw from these cases is that a
prosecutor may discuss the evidence that makes a person worthy or unworthy
of credibility, including the person's demeanor in the witness box, as long as
the prosecutor avoids suggesting that the evidence convinces her as the
prosecutor to believe certain opinions, or that the prosecutor's opinion is
relevant to the jury's determination of the credibility of particular witnesses.
b. Cases Exemplifying "Vouching" in Closing Argument
The court has also dealt with cases in which the prosecutor
interjected his or her personal opinion about a witness's credibility. In the
1973 State v. Williams case, the prosecutor improperly interjected his
personal opinion into closing arguments when the prosecutor stated:
All right, we then spent some time and used up some of your
time in attempting to show that Mrs. Williams - and I'm
sorry. As I say, I have been making final arguments for 16
years, and I can't remember ever using this word before in a
final argument - lied. She lied to you. She said about all her
efforts to give a statement. Why? I don't know what the
purpose of it is, or was. That she tried to give a statement.
But she lied when she said it. We called before you the
State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681, 695-96 (Minn. 2006).
State v. Smith, 541 N.W.2d 584, 589 (Minn. 1996) ("While this court frowns
upon such closing statements, they are permissible.").
1' Everett, 472 N.W.2d at 870 (Minn. 1991).
156

117
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witnesses, and I had to even call each and every secretary in
my office. Is there any question that she lied to you when
she said that?' 59
Similarly, in the 1994 State v. Starkey case, the prosecutor asserted his
personal opinion regarding the credibility of the defendant by stating, "I
mean, I find that impossible to believe that, if that is in fact the fact."' 16 The
statement "inappropriate [vouching]" though ultimately not
court found16the
1
prejudicial.
In the 2006 State v. Swanson case, the court found that the
prosecutor, by stating '"The state believes she is very believable," committed
"impermissible vouching on its face."' 162 The court reviewed the following
portion of the prosecutor's argument:
Candice Hansen, very believable. Very believable witness..
•The believability of Karol House. The state believes she is
very believable, primarily because her case is done . . .
is very believable. Same thing for . . .
[Karol House]
3
16

Schaak

The Swanson court did not take issue with the phrases "Candice Hansen,
very believable. Very believable witness" or "[Karol House] is very
believable;" however, the court refused to overlook the one occasion when
the prosecutor said that "[tihe state believes [Karol House] is very
believable."' 164 That statement, "the state believes," regardless of its context,
was impermissible vouching on its face.' 65 However, the court affirmed the
statements "were not sufficiently
conviction because the prosecutor's
166
prejudicial to warrant a new trial.
The 1984 State v. Ture case provides another example of
vouching. 67 In that case, in closing argument, the prosecutor commented on
the credibility of several of the state's witnesses "by characterizing various
witnesses as being 'honest,' 'a woman of integrity,' 'honest detectives,' and
'honest police officers." ' 168 The prosecutor also "extolled the police officers
as 'not the kind of officers who are going to get up here, take the stand, take
the oath and tell you something if it isn't true.' 169 The prosecutor then
"9 State v. Williams, 210 N.W.2d 21, 24-25 (Minn. 1973).
160 State v. Starkey, 516 N.W.2d 918, 928 (Minn. 1994).

Id. The authors of this article do not believe that the court drew a distinction
between the terms "inappropriate" and "improper" in Starkey.
State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 656 (Minn. 2006) (finding prosecutorial
162
161

error but affirming the conviction because the prosecutor's statements "were not sufficiently
prejudicial to warrant a new trial").
Id. (emphasis added). The court found the statement to be "impermissible
163
vouching on its face because the state directly endorsed the credibility of witness." Id.
164

Id.

165

id.

166

id.

167

State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 516 (Minn. 1984).

168

Id.
Id.

169

2008]

PROSECUTORIAL ERROR

contrasted the state's witnesses to the defendant by referring to the defendant
as a "rapist and murderer" and as a "predator" and characterizing the
defendant's testimony as "[incredible," "a lot of nonsense" and as a
"joke."'170 The prosecutor also stated, "I suggest to you that Mr. Ture is not
only wrong, but not exactly telling the truth on the stand.",17' The court
evaluated the prosecutor's arguments in the following terms:
Both those portions of the final argument of the prosecutor
endorsing the credibility of the state's witnesses and
injecting personal opinion as to defendant's credibility were
clearly improper. The credibility of a witness is to be
determined by the jury. An advocate may indeed point to
circumstances which cast doubt on a witness' [sic] veracity
or which corroborates his or her testimony, but he may not
throw onto the scales of credibility the weight of his own
personal opinion. Such conduct is expressly prohibited by
the Minnesota Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7106(C)(4), and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, § 35.8(b) (2nd ed. 1980).... [Tjhose parts of the prosecutor's
final argument were clearly improper .... 7
If one attempts to extrapolate a common meaning from cases such as
Williams, Starkey, Swanson, Ture, and others, 73 it appears that it is
impermissible for a prosecutor to state in his or her closing argument any
conclusion the prosecutor has about the believability of a particular witness
or particular piece of evidence. Error may take place by mere mention of the
words "the state believes" or "honest witness."
2. Cases That Blur the Line Between "Vigorously Arguing Credibility"
and "Vouching"
The previously-cited cases assume that there is a clear line between
"vigorously arguing credibility" and improperly vouching for a witness's
credibility. This line is increasingly difficult to draw upon reading additional
Minnesota Supreme Court cases. In at least three contexts, it appears that the
court has been unclear when defining the propriety of a prosecutor's
170

Id.

17
172

Id.

Id.

See State v. James, 520 N.W.2d 399, 405 (Minn. 1994) (finding the prosecutor
committed misconduct by "informing the jury of his personal opinion of James' credibility
and character and the credibility of Juanita Gatlin, by disparaging the theories defense counsel
would likely advance in closing argument, and by misleading the jury as to the state's burden
of proof;" however, the court found that such comments were harmless); State v. Schultz, 262
N.W.2d 411, 411 (Minn. 1978) (finding that, while the prosecutor expressed his personal
opinion of defendant's guilt, the comments did not prejudice the defendant); State v. O'Geay,
216 N.W.2d 636, 636 (Minn. 1974) (holding it was error for prosecutor to state his personal
opinion that the defendant was guilty, but it was not reversible error).
173

HAMLINE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

credibility arguments. First, the court has not been clear about whether
referring to witnesses with positive or negative epithets such as "believable
person" is improper. 174 Second, the court has not been clear about whether a
prosecutor's direct statement that a witness is lying or telling the truth is
whether a
improper.1 75 Third, the court has not been clear when determining 176
prosecutor's use of "r' statements in closing argument is improper.
a. The "Believable Person" Context
The court has stated that "prosecutors tread on dangerous grounds..
when they resort to epithets to drive home the falsity of defense
evidence.'77 However, in a number of other cases, the court has permitted
the prosecutor to refer to witnesses by using synonyms that connote
credibility, even though the court previously barred use of phrases such as
"honest detectives" and "woman of integrity.' ' 178 These contradictions in
court holdings do not provide clarity to prosecutors.
For example, in 2006, the court held in State v. Gail that it was not
improper for the prosecutor to refer to a witness as a "believable person" or
state that the witness was "frank and sincere."'' 79 The court held that the state
was "merely arguing that [the witness] was credible."18 The Gail court
stated that vouching occurs only "when the government implies a guarantee
of a witness's truthfulness, refers to facts outside the record, or expresses a
personal opinion as to a witness's credibility."' 8' The Gail holding is
reasonable, but the court did not dwell on its direct contradiction of the 1984
Ture decision, where using epithets such as "honest detectives" or "woman
of integrity" was improper, regardless of the context. 182 The Swanson court
in 2006 also appears to have overlooked statements such as "Candice
Hansen, very believable. Very believable witness," while at the same time
finding the83phrase "The state believes she is very believable" to be improper
vouching.
Then, later in 2006, in an apparent diversion from the rule stated in
Gail, the court in State v. Mayhorn reverted to Ture's blanket restriction on
prosecutors using a synonym to connote the credibility of a witness, even if

174
175
176

177
178

179
180
181

182
183

See infra Part ll.A.2.a.
See infra Part III.A.2.b.
See infra Part ll.A.2.c.
State v. Booker, 348 N.W.2d 753,755 (Minn. 1984) (citation omitted).
See State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 516 (Minn. 1984).
State v. Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 866 (Minn. 2006).
id.

Id. (citing State v. Lopez-Rios, 669 N.W.2d 603, 614 (Minn. 2003)).
See Ture, 353 N.W.2d at 516.
State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 656 (Minn. 2006).
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the prosecutor avoids explicitly stating an opinion.184 The court in Mayhorn
stated:
[D]uring her rebuttal to Mayhorn's closing argument, the
prosecutor commented that "Lyra" was an appropriate name
for Lyra Robinson, who corroborated Mayhorn's testimony.
Mayhom did not object. We understand this comment to
suggest that Lyra Robinson was a liar .... It is improper for

a prosecutor to give her own opinion about the credibility of
a witness in closing argument....
This comment constituted
185

prosecutorial misconduct.

Can Gail, Swanson, and Mayhorn be reconciled? If a prosecutor's reference
to a witness as "believable" and "frank and sincere" can be proper within the
context of an argument about the witness's credibility, 186 why would a
prosecutor, defense attorney, or trial judge think that a prosecutor's
veiled
87
allusion to a witness's incredibility would be prosecutorial error?'
In another seeming contradiction of the Ture decision, the court in
State v. Smith determined that it was not error when the prosecutor told
jurors about the danger of a police officer's work and declared that the
officers "deserved a great deal of credit."' 88 In some cases, statements that
184 State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 791 (Minn. 2006) (citing State v. Porter,
526 N.W.2d 359, 364 (Minn. 1995)).
185

Id.

186

See, e.g., State v. Cox, No. A06-555, 2007 WL 2034214, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App.

July 17, 2007). In Cox, the court of appeals found that the prosecutor did not err when the
prosecutor told the jury in closing argument: "[A.R.] has been consistent throughout the whole
ordeal. She has been truthful. She is believable and she is a credible witness." Id. The court
held that the prosecutor's statements were proper because "the prosecutor analyzed the
evidence and referred only to the evidence and proper inferences to be drawn to argue that
A.R. was a credible witness, without expressing a personal opinion as to credibility." Id.
187
See State v. Googins, 255 N.W.2d 805, 806 (Minn. 1977) (holding that a
prosecutor has "a right to analyze the evidence and vigorously argue that the state's witnesses
were worthy of credibility whereas [the] defendant and his witnesses were not"); see also,
e.g., State v. Carruthers, No. A06-1763, 2007 WL 92668, at *5 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16,
2007). In Carruthers,the court of appeals found that the prosecutor did not commit plain error
when the prosecutor told the jury in closing argument that the evidence indicated that that the
defendant was a liar:
[Dr. Carr's photographs and report] totally support[] the State's position
that this man was not acting in self-defense, was not cut wide open the
way he said, was not stabbed the way he told police, and was not the
victim. The ultimate big lie. He wants you to believe that he is the victim
here. Please do not be suckered in by his testimony that you heard here
today. Carefully evaluate everything you hear.
Id. The court held that, although the statement may have constituted error, it did not constitute
plain error because the argument was "at least within or near the range of appropriate
argument[] regarding a defendant's veracity." Id. The holding in Carruthers is reasonable
because the prosecutor directed the jury's attention to the evidence that contradicted the
defendant's testimony, told the jury to evaluate the evidence, and did not express a personal
opinion as to credibility. However, would the Mayhorn court disagree?
188 State v. Smith, 476 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Minn. 1991) ("This bordered on the
improper, but here again the trial court, who was there, found no prejudice and we agree.").
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encourage the jury to revere the state's witnesses are permissible.' 89 For
example, the court in State v. Burgess found no impropriety when the
prosecutor indirectly vouched for the credibility of a witness:
Now, I submit to you that in my opinion this young man is
entitled to some degree of credit for getting out of bed,
determining where the crash sounds were coming from, and
then taking the time and the trouble and effort to report it.
Needless to say, too many would be inclined to go back to
bed and say, 'Well, forget it, because it doesn't involve me.'
But he did not. He did his civic duty by reporting to the
police ....He told you what he saw. He told you what he
did about it, and for that he is entitled to some credit.19
The court found that giving a witness "credit for doing his civic duty is not
equivalent to expressing a personal opinion that the witness is entitled to
credence." 191 Yet, under Ture, it is impermissible to state that the state's
police witnesses are "not the kind of officers who are going to get
up here,
19 2
take the stand, take the oath and tell you something if it isn't true."'
It is possible, upon reading the transcripts of the closing arguments
in all of these cases, that the court's determinations would appear less
contradictory; however, when faced with only the words in its opinions, the
court should not claim that there is a clear rule about the prosecutor's use of
these sorts of statements. Further, the court has not clarified why a phrase
such as "the state believes [the witness] is believable" is more egregious than
plainly referring to a witness as "believable."' 193 Though the court seems to
believe that there is a wide gulf between the two statements, 194 without
further explanation, it seems implausible that the phrases would affect jurors
differently.
To go one step further, arguendo, a reasonable court could find that
the phrase "the state believes that the witness is believable" is even more
acceptable than a phrase that discreetly glues the epithet "believable" to a
witness's name. It is worth noting that, in a typical jury trial, the judge's
instructions to the jury at the beginning 195 and the end' 96 of the trial include
189

See, e.g., State v. Burgess, 185 N.W.2d 537, 539 (Minn. 1971) (giving a

witness "credit for doing his civic duty is not equivalent to expressing a personal opinion that
the witness is entitled to credence").
190 Id. (emphasis added).
191 Id.
192

See State v. Ture, 353 N.W.2d 502, 516 (Minn. 1984).

193 State v. Swanson, 707 N.W.2d 645, 656 (Minn. 2006).
194 id.
195 See 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES - CRIMINAL 1.02A
(5th ed. 2006) (instruction at beginning of trial).
This trial is about to begin. During the trial you are going to hear the
testimony of several witnesses. You will have to make judgments about
the credibility and weight of their testimony. Be patient, and listen
carefully to the testimony of all the witnesses. Keep it all in mind until
you have heard all the evidence. As you listen to the witnesses, you
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an explanation to jurors that any statements or arguments made by the
attorneys are not evidence. At least when a prosecutor identifies her opinion
and explains the evidentiary basis for the opinion, the prosecutor can focus
the jury's attention solely on the evidence. Several cases from Wisconsin
illustrate the point. 197 For example, in the 2003 State v. Smith case, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals noted:
The line between permissible and impermissible final
argument is not easy to follow and is charted by the peculiar
circumstances of each trial. Whether the prosecutor's
conduct during closing argument affected the fairness of the
trial is determined by viewing the statements in the context
of the total trial. The line of demarcation to which we refer is
thus drawn where the prosecutor goes beyond reasoning
from the evidence to a conclusion of guilt and instead
suggests that the jury arrive at a verdict by considering

should take note of such matters as the witnesses' interest or lack of
interest in the outcome of the case; ability and opportunity to know,
remember, and tell the facts; their experience, frankness, and sincerity,
or the lack thereof; the reasonableness or unreasonableness of their
testimony in light of all the other evidence; and any other factors that
bear on the question of believability and credibility. In the last analysis,
you should rely on your own experience, judgment, and common sense.
... You should keep an open mind about all the evidence until the end
of the trial, until you have heard the final arguments of the attorneys,
and until I have instructed you in the law. Evidence is what the
witnesses say and any exhibits submitted to you. What the attorneys say
is not evidence. However, you should listen attentively to any
statements the attorneys make. Those statements are made so that you
can better understandthe testimony.
Id. (emphasis added).
196 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GuiDEs - CRIMINAL 3.11 (5th ed.
2006) (instructions at end of trial).
Attorneys are officers of the court. It is their duty to make objections they
think proper and to argue their client's cause. However, the arguments or
other remarks of an attorney are not evidence. If the attorneys or I have
made or should make any statement as to what the evidence is, which
differs from your recollection of the evidence, you should disregard the
statement and rely solely on your own memory. If an attorney's argument
contains any statement of the law that differs from the law I give you,
disregardthe statement.
Id. (emphasis added).
197 See State v. Draize, 276 N.W.2d 784, 789 (Wis. 1979); State v. Cydzik, 211
N.W.2d 421, 428-29 (Wis. 1973); Embry v. State, 174 N.W.2d 521, 526-27 (Wis. 1970); State
v. Murphy, No. 00-1283-CR, 2001 WL 1093004, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2001); State
v. Hinojosa, No. 98-2857-CR, 2000 WL 523753, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. May 2, 2000); State v.
Lallaman, No. 00-0529-CR, 2000 WL 1579519, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2000); see also
State v. Smith, 671 N.W.2d 854, 858-60 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the line between
proper and improper closing argument is whether the prosecutor has an evidentiary basis for
the statements he makes to the jury).
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factors other than the evidence. Argument on matters not in
evidence is improper. 198
b. The "He Lied" or "She Told the Truth" Context
In some cases, the court determined that it is permissible for a
prosecutor to directly state that a witness is lying or telling the truth.' 99 For
example, in State v. Booker, a 1984 case, the defendant was on trial for
criminal sexual conduct and claimed that the victim consented to sex and lied
when she testified.2°° The court found that it was not improper for the
prosecutor to state that it was the defendant, not the victim, who lied during
his testimony, nor was it clearly improper for the prosecutor to repeatedly
refer to the crime of perjury in closing arguments. 20 1 The court revealed its
ambivalence over its decision when it said that "[t]he prosecutor's statement,
at worst, was a statement on the borderline between being proper and
improper comment and it clearly was not so serious and prejudicial a
misstatement as to deny defendant his right to a fair trial. 20 2 However, the
court also stated, "[ain argument such as that made in this case ... could
affect the jury's ability to weigh the evidence dispassionately. In an
appropriate case, we will not hesitate to reverse on this ground., 20 3 The court
did not explain what an "appropriate case" might look like.2 °4 The decision
in Booker turned ultimately on a "he said-she said" issue, yet even then the
prosecutor's references to the witness lying were not found to be improper.
Given the court's rulings in other cases and the importance of the credibility
of the witnesses, it is unclear why the prosecutor's statements in Booker
would not be considered improper.20 5
In another case from 1984, State v. Parker, the court found no
impropriety when the prosecutor, in essence, told the jury that he thought the
State's witnesses told the truth because, if they were not telling the truth, the
entire case against the defendant must be fraudulent. 206 The prosecutor
stated:
But there is an even more persuasive reason, I think, they are
telling the truth... That is why I say to you that if you think
that these witnesses are lying, you can only come to that
conclusion if you come to the conclusion that this whole
thing is a phony and stinks from top to bottom and stem to
'9'

Smith, 671 N.W.2d at 858-60 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis

added).
19 See, e.g., State v. Booker, 348 N.W.2d 753, 754 (Minn. 1984).
2
Id.
201 Id. at 755.
202 Id.
203 Id. (citation omitted).
2'
2o
206

See id.
See Booker, 348 N.W.2d at 754.
State v. Parker, 353 N.W.2d 122, 128 (Minn. 1984).
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stern. But I do tell you these witnesses couldn't
have done it
20 7
it.
tell
and
lie
big
a
up
make
by themselves,
Similar to the prosecutor's "borderline" statements in Booker, it is unclear
why an argument like this one in Parker could be proper when the obvious
goal is to rely on the jurors' confidence in "the system" to convince them to
find the state's witnesses are credible. The comments in Parker-even if
they are read as a mere subtle reference to the government's role in the
prosecution of the defendant-seem to offend the plain language of the
court's definition of vouching in the 2003 State v. Lopez-Rios case; in that
case, the court stated that improper vouching included situations in which
"the government [only] implies a guarantee of a witness's truthfulness [or]
refers to facts outside the record. ' 20 Yet, it does not appear that the court has
rejected Parker'sprecedential value, since it was cited in the 2003 State v.
Ray case when the court explained that "[tihe propriety of a prosecutor's
final argument is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court,"2 0
and the Minnesota Court of Appeals used Parker as recently as 2006 to
define prosecutorial vouching.2 10
If the court believes that there is an important distinction between the
phrase "I think [the witnesses] are telling the truth" and "the state believes
the witnesses are credible," it has yet to provide an explanation. Such an
explanation, along with a review of cases such as Booker and Parker, would
help prosecutors understand how they are supposed to discuss the factors
relevant to a witness's credibility and vigorously argue credibility without
saying something that, upon appellate review of the trial transcript, would be
considered an interjection of a personal opinion.
c. The "I Think" Context
The court has examined a number of cases in which a prosecutor has
used the phrase "I think" and its analogies in closing argument. The court has
permitted the use of certain -r, phrases, e.g., the phrase "I submit to you," in
the context of explaining evidence.2 " However, the court has been less clear
with phrases such as "I think." For example, in the 1972 State v. Prettyman
case, the court found that the prosecutor acted impermissibly when he
frequently began sentences with "'I think you'll find that...' or 'I think you

Id. (emphasis added).
State v. Lopez-Rios, 669 N.W.2d 603, 614 (Minn. 2003) (quoting State v.
Patterson, 577 N.W.2d 603, 614 (Minn. 1998)) (emphasis added).
209
State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736, 746 (Minn. 2003) (quoting Parker,353 N.W.2d
at 127).
210 In re Welfare of D.D.R., 713 N.W.2d 891, 900 (Minn. 2006) (quoting Parker,
353 N.W.2d at 128) ("It is improper to 'personally [endorse] the credibility of the state's
witnesses [or to inject] personal opinion ....').
211
See State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 799 (Minn. 2000). But see infra note
207
208
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will be able to find that . . .' even when they are followed by reference
to
212
evidence on an issue or a permissible inference that could be made.,
Similarly, in the 2004 decision of Ture v. State, the court determined
that it was improper for the prosecutor to repeatedly preface his statements
regarding the evidence with the phrase, "I wanted you to see. 213 The court
succinctly concluded that "[any] use of the first-person pronoun 'I' during
closing argument... was an improper interjection of personal opinion. 2 14
The 2005 State v. Blanche court stated that "[a] prosecutor's use of
phrases such as 'I suggest to you' and 'I think' to interject personal opinion
into a closing argument is improper. ''2 15 The Blanche opinion, however, is
prone to confuse the reader because the court states that it did not find "plain
error" when the "prosecutor prefaced approximately 18 statements in closing
argument with phrases such as 'I suggest to you,' 'I think,' 'I ask you,' and 'I
submit to you."' '216 The court referenced the trial court's characterization of
the prosecutor's comments as "inadvertent" and "rooted in the prosecutor's
rhetorical idiosyncrasies" and determined that, "under the facts and
circumstances of this case," the prosecutor's "poorly chosen" statements
were not plain error.21 7 The court's holding is reasonable, but, by finding that
the prosecutor did not commit "plain error," did the court mean that the
prosecutor's statements were not "clearly contrary to the law," perhaps
because the prosecutor's argument was based on the evidence? Or, did the
court mean only that the statements did not meet all of the prongs of the plain
error test, perhaps because the statements did not prejudice the defendant?
To add to the seeming confusion, the court after Blanche has
excused or overlooked phrases by prosecutors in closing argument that,
according to Minnesota Supreme Court precedent, appear to be statements of
personal opinion on material issues. For example, in Gail, a felony-murder
case, the prosecutor suggested his personal opinion that the defendant was
guilty of the underlying felonies when he explained that the jury could find
the defendant guilty even if the defendant had not completed the underlying
felonies:
[Y]ou might decide that in looking at this that while the
defendant had not completed the aggravated robbery or had
212

State v. Prettyman, 198 N.W.2d 156, 158 (Minn. 1972) ("The frequency and

context of the use of these words suggests to us that they were perhaps more idle clich6 than
deliberate expression of personal opinion, and the absence of objection by the defense counsel
who actually heard them adds to this impression. They are, nevertheless, impermissible.").
Ture v. State, 681 N.W.2d 9, 19 (Minn. 2004).
214 Id. at 20. To its credit, the court agreed with the post-conviction court in
finding that the alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when it was made
within the context of a two and a half hour long closing argument that summarized a
complicated murder trial. Id.
215 State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 375 (Minn. 2005) (citing Ture, 681 N.W.2d
at 20).
216 Id. at 374-75.
217 Id.
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not completed the drug sale, although I suggest to you that
he had done both of those, you may decide he hadn't, and
you may decide to look at this as to whether it's an attempt
or not.
The court determined that there was "no misconduct by the state" because he
was "merely telling the jury that Gail could be found guilty [of felonymurder] if the jury found that Gail had attempted, rather than completed, the
underlying felonies. '2 19 The court's holding is reasonable because the
prosecutor seems only to have been arguing the facts and the law to the jury;
however, the court could have been clearer by distinguishing the "I suggest"
statement from similar statements barred in the Blanche and 2004 Ture case.
In a 2007 case, State v. McArthur, the court twice excused or
overlooked a prosecutor's statement of opinion:
Do you think by [the witness] naming the defendant,
things were going to make-be made any easier for [the
witness] given the fact she had a child by the defendant's
brother? I don't think so. She had fear because of that as to
what could happen, what the repercussions would be for her,
not only her own safety but the situation with her child....
When [the witnesses] took that witness stand, did
they appear to be enjoying this? Did little [witness] appear to
be enjoying this when she cried several times? Did [another
witness] seem to be enjoying this being hauled in here after
being arrested for not honoring her subpoena? I don't think
so. Were they getting anything out of this? Nothing. Again,
there's no motive for them to fabricate anything or engage in
a conspiracy with each other. They were afraid to get
involved. They were taking a risk, a safety risk.220
One would be hard-pressed to claim that the prosecutor did not state an
opinion in McArthur; yet, the court stated that "although the prosecutor
perhaps should have prefaced his statement about risk with 'the witnesses
believe,' it was apparent, given the context, that the prosecutor was speaking
from the witnesses' perspective[]" and thus the prosecutor did not err. 22 ' The
court's current view of these sorts of phrases is certainly unclear.
One may wonder why the court would hold that a prosecutor does
not commit vouching when stating "I submit to you that the witness is
credible" but does commit vouching when stating "I think that the witness is
credible." Perhaps, the real issue underlying vouching should not be the
prosecutor's words at all but whether the prosecutor's argument is based on
the evidence. Recently, in State v. Fauci, the Connecticut Supreme Court
218

State v. Gail, 713 N.W.2d 851, 866 (Minn. 2006) (emphasis added).

219

Id.

220

State v. McArthur, 730 N.W.2d 44, 53-54 (Minn. 2007) (emphasis added).
Id. at 54.
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characterized vouching as "a form of unsworn and unchecked testimony"
and clarified that the proper review of a vouching claim is not focused on the
use of the pronoun "I" but rather on whether the prosecutor's statement was
based on the evidence presented at trial.222 The Fauci court stated:
As we previously have noted, "[w]e must give the jury the
credit of being able to differentiate between argument on the
evidence and attempts to persuade [it] to draw inferences in
the state's favor, on one hand, and improper unsworn
testimony, with the suggestion of secret knowledge, on the
other hand." In other words, a prosecutor's remarks are not
improper when they underscore an inference, on the basis of
the evidence presented at trial, that the jury could have
drawn on its own.223
In 1995, the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Reed explained
that a review of the propriety of a prosecutor's closing argument should not
turn on the prosecutor's use of "magic words" but instead on whether the
prosecutor's words express an attempt at bolstering the state's case with
information other than the evidence admitted at trial:
A statement cannot be taken out of context. Just as
jury instructions must be read as a whole, so must the
remarks of the prosecutor. The prosecutor's remarks must be
evaluated in light of the relationship or lack of relationship
they bear to the evidence admitted at trial.
The propriety of the prosecutor's comments "does
not turn on whether or not any magic words are used." The
crucial inquiry is not whether the prosecutor said "We
know" or "I know" or "I believe," but rather whether the
prosecutor was attempting to vouch for the defendant's guilt.
Read as a whole, and in the context of this case, the
prosecutor's use of "we know" does not show an attempt to
place the credibility of his office behind the case or a
suggestion that he possessed extrajudicial information on
which defendant should be convicted. Rather, the prosecutor
was asserting that "we know," on the basis of the evidence
presented at trial and inferences drawn from that evidence,
that the propositions advanced had been established. 24
If the Minnesota Supreme Court explained itself similarly in cases such as
Blanche, Gail, and McArthur, the opinions would not only be clearer, they

222 State v. Fauci, 917 A.2d 978, 988 (Conn. 2007) (citing State v. Thompson, 832
A.2d 626, 643 (Conn. 2003)).
223 Id. at 992-93 (citations omitted).
224 People v. Reed, 535 N.W.2d 496, 508 (Mich. 1995) (citing and quoting People
v. Cowell, 205 N.W.2d 600, 603 (Mich. 1973)).
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could help prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and trial court judges identify
225
prosecutorial vouching in the future.
3. Conclusion on the Clarity of What Constitutes Vouching
Based on the above discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that,
contrary to the Ramey majority's assertion that its prior rulings are clear,226
the Minnesota Supreme Court's cases defining prosecutorial vouching are
confusing and contradictory. Arguments about credibility are indispensable
to a prosecutor's case because a crucial aspect of a prosecutor's function is to
help jurors perform their roles as the judges of credibility.227 As the court
explained, prosecutors have a right to "vigorously argue" witness
credibility. 228 Further, criminal defendants are unnecessarily harmed when
defense attorneys and trial courts cannot easily ascertain when prosecutors
act improperly.
Reasonable prosecutors understand that they share the obligation to
reduce incidents of prosecutorial error 9 and that they have an "affirmative
225 Compare Reed, 536 N.W.2d at 508, with State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782,
799 (Minn. 2000). Bradford's economical but vague analysis of the propriety of the statement,
"I submit to you that [Overall] was killed by her partner.. ." was:
Bradford argues that the prosecutor improperly offered her personal
opinion when she stated: "I submit to you [Overall] was killed by her
partner ...." A prosecutor may not offer a personal opinion as to the
defendant's guilt. However, in this case the state was offering an
interpretation of the evidence rather than a personal opinion as to guilt.
Therefore, we conclude that this statement does not constitute
prosecutorial misconduct.
Bradford, 618 N.W.2d at 799 (citation omitted). Because the prosecutor was discussing the
evidence, the Bradford court's holding seems reasonable, but Bradford's analysis does
nothing to explain why the phrase "I submit to you" is more proper than phrases such as "I
believe" when the prosecutor is arguing about the evidence and fails to explain why the
prosecutor was merely offering an interpretation of the evidence rather than vouching. See id.
226 State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 299-302 (Minn. 2006). The Ramey court
"expect[s] that prosecutors ... are aware of [its] case law proscribing particular conduct as
well as the standards of conduct prescribed by the ABA," and, with its decision in Ramey,
aimed to prevent "conduct that prosecutors should know is clearly forbidden." Id. at 301-02
(emphasis added).
227 See 10 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES - CRIMINAL 3.12 (5th
ed. 2006) (instructing jurors that they are the sole judges of whether witnesses are to be
believed and informing them about what factors they may take into consideration when
judging credibility). Jurors are told that they may take into consideration a witness's
credibility based on several factors, including (1) interest or lack of interest in the outcome of
the case; (2) relationship to the parties; (3) ability and opportunity to know, remember, and
relate the facts; (4) manner; (5) age and experience; (6) frankness and sincerity, or lack
thereof; (7) reasonableness of their testimony in light of all the other evidence in the case; (8)
any impeachment of the witness's testimony; and (9) any other factors that bear on
believability and weight. Id.
228 State v. Googins, 255 N.W.2d 805, 806 (Minn. 1977) (emphasis added).
229 See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 303.
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obligation to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial., 230 To help
prosecutors fulfill their ethical obligations,23' the court should be clearer in
defining "prescribed standards of conduct, 232 than it has been in the past. For

example, in United States v. Bess, a Sixth Circuit case from thirty years ago,
the court distinguished between proper and improper uses of the phrase "I
believe" in an impressively straightforward way:
[T]he statement made here "based on the evidence that has
been presented to you in this trial, I believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully took or
concealed the metal or ammunition," is unquestionably a
statement of personal belief.
We realize that oftentimes it will be a close question
whether a prosecutor oversteps. Illustrative of the problem is
use of the words "I believe." The Fifth Circuit has done a
good job in drawing the line between permissible and
impermissible argument: 'Thus, an attorney properly may
state, 'I believe that the evidence has shown the defendant's
guilt,' but he may not state, 'I believe that the defendant is
guilty.' Similarly, an attorney properly may state, 'No
conflict exists in the testimony of the prosecution's
witnesses,' but he may not state, 'The prosecution's
witnesses are telling the truth,' or 'I believe that the
prosecution's witnesses are telling the truth."'
We reiterate that under many circumstances, this
type of prosecutorial error will not be prejudicial. We write
to draw the line as clearly as possible to encourage proper
argument and alert both opposing counsel and trial
judges so
233
that corrective measures can be taken on the spot.
Bess,23 4 Fauci,235 and Reed 236 are good models for any court to use when
seeking to distinguish between proper and improper conduct because they
are both informative and helpful for practitioners.
B. Ramey Jeopardizesthe Trial Court'sAbility to Remedy the Effects of

Prosecutorial Error
Experienced trial judges and trial attorneys know that when an
attorney objects to an error as it occurs, the trial court has great capacity to
Id. at 300 (citing State v. Henderson, 620 N.W.2d 688, 701-02 (Minn. 2001);
State v. Sha, 193 N.W.2d 829, 831 (Minn. 1972)).
230

231 See generally ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
FUNCTION, supra note 140.
232 State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 303 (Minn. 2006).
233 United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 757 n.10 (6th Cir. 1978).
234

id.

235
236

State v. Fauci, 917 A.2d 978, 988 (Conn. 2007).
People v. Reed, 535 N.W.2d 496, 508 (Mich. 1995).
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remedy any unfairly prejudicial effects of the error on the spot. In fact, the
Minnesota Supreme Court has noted that the trial court, not the appellate
court, is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial nature of a closing
argument,237 and the trial court is in the best position to "attempt to remedy
the effects of [prosecutor error]. 238 A proper objection is potent because it
provides an opportunity for the trial court to issue an immediate verbal
reprimand to the prosecutor and an immediate verbal curative instruction to
the jury. Without question, a fundamental presumption of the jury system is
that jurors follow the trial court's instructions.239 Consequently, parties
should be encouraged to object when appropriate. Unfortunately, the
majority in Ramey seems to have encouraged defense attorneys to not object
to prosecutorial errors. The majority's opinion does this by marginalizing the
contemporaneous objection rule and by making it easier for claims of
unobjected-to prosecutorial error to succeed on appeal. 24° In doing so, Ramey
slights a fundamental aspect of the jury trial system, namely the ability of the
trial court to remedy errors with curative instructions to ensure that the
defendant receives a fair trial the first time.24 '
The majority grants that a trial judge is in a unique position to
determine what actions constitute prosecutorial error.242 The Ramey majority
explained that, through "[c]arefully worded instructions," a trial judge can
"prevent," "ameliorate," or "cure" the effect of improper prosecutorial
argument.243 Because the majority acknowledged that a trial judge has the
unique opportunity, is in the best position, and has an affirmative duty to
237

See State v. Mayhom, 720 N.W.2d 776, 783 (Minn. 2006); see also State v.

Parker, 353 N.W.2d 122, 127 (Minn. 1984) (citing State v. Fossen, 282 N.W.2d 496, 503
(Minn. 1979)) ("The propriety of a prosecutor's final argument is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court.").
238

Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 299.

239

See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 211 (1987) ("[T]he almost

invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions ... is a pragmatic one,
rooted less in the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than in the belief that it
represents a reasonable practical accommodation of the interests of the state and the defendant
in the criminal justice process."); see also State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 509 (Minn.
2005) (noting that this presumption may be rebutted if the effect of a prosecutor's improper
statements "impart substantial prejudicial evidence into the case"); State v. Taylor, 650
N.W.2d 190, 207 (Minn. 2002); State v. Miller, 573 N.W.2d 661, 675 (Minn. 1998); State v.
Forcier, 420 N.W.2d 884, 885 n.1 (Minn. 1988); State v. Bums, 929 A.2d 1041, 1054 (N.J.
2007).
240
State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 299-300 (Minn. 2006) (falling to explain
when the contemporaneous-objection rule applies to instances of unobjected-to prosecutorial
error and shifting the burden of proof to the state on the third prong of the plain error test for
instances of unobjected-to prosecutorial error).
241
Id. at 299. Note that "the Constitution guarantees a fair trial-not a perfect or
error-free trial." State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 513 (Minn. 2006) (citing State v.
Greenleaf, 591 N.W.2d 488, 505 (Minn. 1999)).
242
Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 298 (citing State v. Steward, 645 N.W.2d 115, 121
(Minn. 2002)).
243 Id. (citing State v. Brown, 348 N.W.2d 743, 747 (Minn. 1984)).
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intervene and caution prosecutors in appropriate circumstances, 244 the
majority-in dicta-tried to encourage defense attorneys to "seek corrective
action by the trial court when misconduct occurs.,' 245 However, attorneys are
influenced far more by the law than by encouragement in dicta, and it is
more likely that because of Ramey, defense attorneys will not object to
incidents of prosecutorial error.
The Ramey majority cautioned defense attorneys that "the failure to
object to improper closing argument may waive any claim of prosecutorial
misconduct on appeal." 246 However, the Ramey majority never explained
when the failure to object would act as a waiver. In fact, the majority never
described any situations involving prosecutorial error when the defense
attorney's failure to object to prosecutorial error forfeits the defendant's right
to appeal. 247 The majority instead explained that unobjected-to prosecutorial
error should be reviewed for plain error and placed the burden of proving a
negative in the third prong of the plain error test on prosecutors.24 8 Under
Ramey, this apparently means that no claims of unobjected-to prosecutorial
error are waived due to the contemporaneous objection rule.
If claims of prosecutorial error are never or rarely barred by the
defense attorney's failure to object, the strategies behind a defense attorney's
decision whether to object will change. It is reasonable to predict that a
defense attorney would not object if she believed her case was going badly
and the appellate court would award a new trial on appeal. Minnesota
defense attorneys apparently already make these calculations and decide to
not object to incidents of error, as claims of unobjected-to error have become
widespread in the past few years.249
Consider In re D.D.R, a juvenile case involving charges of criminal
sexual conduct where the defendant alleged numerous trial court errors and
several unobjected-to prosecutorial errors. 250 The court of appeals analyzed
Id. at 303 (quoting State v. Glaze, 452 N.W.2d 655, 662 (Minn. 1990)).
Id. at 299, 303 (emphasis added).
246 Id. at 299 (quoting State v. Ray, 659 N.W.2d 736,747 n.4 (Minn. 2003)).

244
245
247

Id.

248

State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 302 (Minn. 2006). The authors wonder

whether, by shifting the burden of proof to the state in the third prong of the plain error test,
the court also has prevented the use of the defendant's failure to object as a factor in
determining whether the alleged error was prejudicial enough to jeopardize his right to a fair
trial. Contra State v. Fauci, 917 A.2d 978, 995 (Conn. 2007).
In determining whether the prosecutorial impropriety was severe, this
court considers it highly significant that defense counsel failed to object to
the improper remark, to request curative instructions, or to move for a
mistrial. A failure to object demonstrates that defense counsel presumably
did not view the alleged impropriety as prejudicial enough to jeopardize
seriously the defendant's right to a fair trial.
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
249 Kingrey, supra note 33; see also infra notes 253-257 and accompanying text.
250 In re Welfare of D.D.R., 713 N.W.2d 891, 897-907 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)
(reviewing several alleged trial errors and finding that, "[a]lthough ... no one individual error
.. . requires a new trial, the cumulative effect of trial error requires a new trial"). The
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each alleged error separately and found that no error was significant enough
on its own to justify reversal; however, the court ordered a new trial, holding
that "the cumulative effect of trial error require[d] a new trial. 25 In re
D.D.R., a complex case involving several contested evidentiary issues that
are typically ripe for appeal, illustrates how a defense attorney might choose
to not object to prosecutorial error as part of a strategy to improve the
defendant's appellate case.252
A recent review of Minnesota appellate decisions found that, during
the last twenty years, the appellate courts' willingness to review claims of
unobjected-to trial errors for plain error has increased dramatically.253 In
other words, when the courts have had a choice between substantively
reviewing an unobjected-to error or barring review of the claim because of
the defendant's failure to object, the appellate courts are now far more
willing to substantively review the error. Twenty years ago, Minnesota
defendant alleged errors in the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence due to
purported discovery violations, several of the trial court's evidentiary decisions, the trial
court's instruction to the jury that the victim's testimony need not be corroborated, and several
instances of unobjected-to prosecutorial error. Id.
Id. at 907.
2
252 In re D.D.R. also illustrates that the court of appeals has difficulty
in
determining whether a prosecutor has vouched for a witness's credibility or vigorously argued
for the witness's credibility. The defendant in In re D.D.R. alleged that the prosecutor
vouched for the victim's credibility when the prosecutor argued in closing argument:
And why, if [the victim] made it all up, is she able to tell the same details
of the rape over and over and over again? Why does she tell the same
details of the assault to her friend? Why does she tell the same details of
the assault to her mom? Why does she tell the same details of the assault
to police officers, the medical staff at North Memorial and to you?... It's
difficult to say and keep the exact same facts in order over and over and
over again. A 12-year old girl can't do that. She can't keep straight things
that aren't true... You all know it's easier to keep the truth straight than
it ever could be to keep the details of a lie straight.
Id. at 900. In a 2-1 decision, the court of appeals held that the "prosecutor improperly vouched
for the credibility of the witnesses by essentially guaranteeing that the victim cannot have
testified untruthfully based on her age and consistency." Id. (emphasis added). In dissent,
Judge Lansing disagreed with the majority opinion, arguing that "it is not plain error for the
prosecutor to argue the credibility of [the victim's] testimony. The state is allowed to make
reasonable and vigorous arguments on credibility." Id. at 908-09 (Lansing, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted). The majority never explains how the prosecutor "essentially guarantee[d]"
the victim's credibility by highlighting the victim's prior consistent statements. See id. Based
on the case law cited in this article, the prosecutor's argument in In re D.D.R. seems perfectly
valid and appropriate, and the majority's discussion of this issue did little to help prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and trial judges understand the law.
253 See Kingrey, supra note 33 (referencing data compiled by the Hennepin
County Attorneys Office Appellate Section).
254 See, e.g., State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 684-85 (Minn. 2001) ("Failure to
object to the ... evidence generally constitutes waiver of the right to appeal on that basis.
However, an appellate court may consider a waived issue if there is (1) error, (2) that is plain,
and (3) the error affects the defendant's substantial rights.") (citations omitted); State v.
Schneider, 597 N.W.2d 889, 894 (Minn. 1999) ("We note that because Schneider's counsel
did not object to the admissibility of the DNA evidence, any objection to its admission was
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appellate courts reviewed for plain error only 37% of defendants' claims of
unobjected-to error. 2 " Ten years ago, that rate was 50%. 156 From January
2004 to October 2005, Minnesota appellate courts reviewed 92% of all
defendants' claims of unobjected-to errors.257 Furthermore, now that the
Ramey majority has shifted the burden of proof to the state, there is reason to
believe that defense attorneys will increasingly choose to take their chances
on appeal rather than object at trial because the new standard should make it
easier for defendants to win their appeals.258
Perhaps because the Ramey majority knew that its holding would
encourage defense attorneys to not object, the court, quoting State v. Glaze,
told trial courts that they "have a duty to intervene and caution the
prosecutor, even in the absence of objection, in appropriate
circumstances., 2 59 It is noteworthy that in Glaze, the appropriate
circumstances were unmistakably prejudicial. In Glaze, the defendant was
charged with three counts of first degree murder. z ° In the prosecutor's
closing argument, the prosecutor made three improper statements: (1) "The
crimes that [the defendant] did, actually [a conviction by the jury] will never
be enough;" (2) 'This defendant has got far better representation than he
deserved for what he did;" and (3) "[W]hen I think about this case, I'm just
knowingly waived."); Schneider, 597 N.W.2d at 896 (Page, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"[w]hile failure to object . . . generally constitutes waiver of the issue on appeal, we do
consider plain errors affecting substantial rights if the error had the effect of denying the
defendant a fair trial"); State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998) ("Although Griller
did not object to the jury instructions at trial, we have the discretion to consider this issue on
appeal if it is plain error affecting substantial rights."); State v. Beard, 288 N.W.2d 717, 718
(Minn. 1980) (holding that "because [the] defendant failed to object at trial to the
circumstances of his arrest or to the trial court's admission of police testimony of statements
he made following receipt of a Miranda warning during postarrest [sic] interrogation, he
forfeited his right to have such issues considered on appeal.").
255 Kingrey, supranote 33.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 But see infra note 327 (showing that post-Ramey cases do not suggest an
increase in reversals due to prosecutorial error). Possibly, the court does not know how to
handle the change in the third-prong of the plain error test, i.e., is it a heavy burden? Is it a
high threshold? How does the state prove a negative satisfactorily? This possible confusion
may be why appellate courts after Ramey appear to emphasize that even if all three prongs of
the plain error test are satisfied, reversal is not warranted unless "the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of the judicial proceeding is seriously affected." See, e.g., State v. Dobbins,
725 N.W.2d 492, 508 (Minn. 2006); State v. Sivixay, No. A05-2416, 2007 WL 1120566, at *1
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2007) (citing Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d at 508).
If the three prongs of the plain error test are met, we will "then assess
whether [we] should address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity
of the judicial proceedings." We will correct the error only if the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings is seriously
affected.
Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d at 508 (quoting State v. Morton, 701 N.W.2d 225, 234 (Minn. 2005)).
259 State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 303 (Minn. 2006) (quoting State v. Glaze,
452 N.W.2d 655,662 (Minn. 1990)).
260 Glaze, 452 N.W.2d at 656.
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outraged., 261 Most trial judges would intervene if the prosecutor made these
improper and prejudicial statements.
However, experience suggests that trial judges do not believe that it
is wise to intervene a great deal in criminal trials, and this likely means that
the Ramey majority's directive is unlikely to change the behavior of trial
judges, who must maintain absolute impartiality at trial. 262 In practice, most
judges will not intervene sua sponte unless serious issues arise-situations in
which unfair prejudice is obvious. Rule 2.02(c) and Rule 2.02(d) of the
Minnesota General Rules of Practice for the District Courts state:
(c) Impartiality. During the presentation of the case, the
judge shall maintain absolute impartiality, and shall neither
by word or sign indicate favor to any party to the litigation.
The judge shall be impersonal in addressing the lawyers,
litigants and other officers of the court.
(d) Intervention. The judge should generally refrain from
intervening in the examination of witnesses or argument of
counsel; however, the court shall intervene upon its own
initiative to prevent a miscarriage of justice or obvious error
of law.263
The typical judge would not intervene if she heard a prosecutor say, "the
State believes the witness is credible." The judge might look up at the
defense attorney in an effort to prompt an objection, but, in such a case, the
judge likely would not find the statement so unfairly prejudicial that it
required judicial intervention, especially considering the fact that the judge
typically tells jurors at the beginning and end of the trial that they are the sole
judges of credibility and that anything that the attorneys say is not
evidence. 264 Additionally, a trial judge is unlikely to intervene immediately
because the judge has to wait to consider the entire context of the argument
so she can make a proper evaluation without unnecessarily interrupting the
argument. 265 The duty to object in such a case falls directly upon the defense
attorney's shoulders, not on the neutral trial court.

261

Id. at 661-62.

See MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3 (2006) ("A Judge Shall
Perform the Duties of the Office Impartially and Diligently"). One also may recall the famous
quote attributed to Socrates: "Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer
wisely, to consider soberly, and to decide impartially." See Etzel v. Rosenbloom, 189 P.2d
848, 852 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948); Commonwealth v. King, 839 A.2d 237, 243 (Pa. 2003).
263 MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. DIST. CT. 2.02(c)-(d) (2006) (emphasis added). "These
rules shall apply in all trial courts of the state." Id. at 1.01.
262

264

MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES - CRIMINAL 1.02A (5th ed.

2006) (instruction at beginning of trial); id. at 3.06 (referring to rulings on objections to
evidence); id. at 3.11 (referring to statements of judge and attorneys); id. at 3.12 (instructing
jurors that they are the sole judges of credibility).
265 In contrast, on appeal, appellate courts see the statements more glaringly in
isolation, although they do attempt to consider the statements in context.
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On the other hand, if the defense attorney objects during closing
argument, the trial court will act.26 In all but the most serious incidents of
error, the trial judge can make it possible for the defendant to receive a fair
trial. Assuming the trial court knows the law, if the defense attorney's
objection is proper, the court would sustain the objection and issue a strong
verbal admonition to the prosecutor and the jury. If the trial court sustains the
objection, the jury is presumed to disregard the evidence. 267 For example, the
judge would state in a stern voice:
The objection is sustained. Jurors, the prosecutor's statement
was improper. As I've told you previously, the attorneys'
statements are not evidence. You should consider only the
evidence. You should disregardthe prosecutor's statement.
The statement should not play any part in your deliberations.
You, the jurors, are the sole judges of credibility.
Experienced prosecutors, defense attorneys, and trial judges know that a
strong admonition by the bench hurts the prosecutor's credibility and thus
her case-and is consequently extremely effective. In fact, one of the justices
at the Ramey oral argument stated:
It takes but once during a final argument for a judge to shut
down a lawyer in the midst of argument for the lawyer to get
the message. Why shouldn't our standard of review reflect
that? I mean, after all, the battle is at the . . . trial level.
We're reading words here.268
The jury will follow the judge's instructions, and the prosecutor is unlikely to
risk making the same mistake in that courtroom again. All effective trial
attorneys know that their credibility with the court and the jury is crucial. It
is neither "naive" nor "fiction" to think that a judicial admonition is
incapable of correcting the effects of prosecutorial error.269 Trial judges
See MrNN. R. EviD. 103(b).
State v. Steward, 645 N.W.2d 115, 122 (Minn. 2002); see also MINNESOTA
JURY INSTRUCTIONS GuiDEs - CRINAL 3.06 (5th ed. 2006) (referring to rulings on

266

267

PRACnCE,

objections to evidence).
268 See Minnesota Supreme Court Oral Arguments - Videos, supranote 68.
269 See Respondent's Brief at 15, State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006)
(No. A04-1056), 2005 WL 4859274 ("The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.")
(quoting State v. Caldwell, 322 N.W.2d 574, 590-91 (Minn. 1982)); see also Minnesota
Supreme Court Oral Arguments - Videos, supra note 68 (arguing, on behalf of the defendant,
that Caldwell states that a curative instruction can be counterproductive and that the ability of
a curative instruction to overcome prejudice is an "unmitigated fiction" for practicing
attorneys). It is noteworthy that the "naive assumption" quote, originally authored in 1949 by
United States Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, seems to be a misappropriation. See
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice
Jackson used the language when discussing the challenges facing a trial court judge when
hearing a case involving conspiracy charges. Id. Justice Jackson wrote:
When the trial starts, the accused feels the full impact of the conspiracy
strategy. Strictly, the prosecution should first establish prima facie the
conspiracy and identify the conspirators, after which evidence of acts and
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should remedy prosecutorial error if the defense attorney objects or grant a
mistrial if the error cannot be cured.
The system of managing prosecutorial error described in the
preceding paragraph hinges on the trial judge knowing what is clearly
contrary to the law and on defense attorneys objecting to prosecutorial error
when it arises. Because the Minnesota Supreme Court holds that trial judges
are in the best position to identify and remedy prosecutorial error,270 it seems
that the majority should have allowed trial courts to do just that. For
example, the court could have applied the Grillerplain error standard, voiced
support for the ability of trial judges to handle prejudicial error, and
encouraged defense attorneys to object to error. Instead of doing that,
however, the court mandated "more scrutinizing review ' 271 of claims of
unobjected-to prosecutorial error by appellate courts and gave defense
attorneys much less incentive to object at trial.272 Ramey actually places an
extra burden on trial courts, who now apparently must abandon their
impartiality and substitute their own judgment for that of the defense
attorney.
C. Ramey Contradictsthe Ideals of JudicialRestraint
As the concurring justices point out, the majority opinion in Ramey
violated the ideals of judicial restraint.273 Above and beyond any concerns
the concurring justices had about the majority's views on prosecutorial error,
declarations of each in the course of its execution are admissible against
all. But the order of proof of so sprawling a charge is difficult for a judge
to control. As a practical matter, the accused often is confronted with a
hodgepodge of acts and statements by others which he may never have
authorized or intended or even known about, but which help to persuade
the jury of existence of the conspiracy itself. In other words, a conspiracy
often is proved by evidence that is admissible only upon assumption that
conspiracy existed. The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be
overcome by instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be
unmitigated fiction.
Id. (citations omitted). Except for its dramatic hyperbole, it is unclear why Justice Jackson's
language has been used to discredit the effectiveness of a trial court's use of direct, immediate
verbal admonitions in open court to remedy improper statements made by attorneys in closing
argument.
270 See, e.g., Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 294; State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776, 783
(Minn. 2006); State v. Parker, 353 N.W.2d 122 (Minn. 1984) ("The propriety of a
prosecutor's final argument is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court.") (citing
State v. Fossen, 282 N.W.2d 496, 503 (Minn. 1979)).
271 See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 303.
272 Id. at 299 (sensing the possibility of encouraging defense attorneys to fail to
object by stating, "We would be concerned if defense counsel were deliberately passing on
such an objection with the hope of securing reversible error for appeal and, as a result, getting
two chances at a jury trial.").
273 See id. at 303-04 (P. Anderson, J., concurring); id. at 304-07 (Gildea, J.,
concurring).
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the true focus of their concern was the majority's lack of judicial restraint. 274
The concurring justices' criticisms are reasonable. As mentioned above, the
majority formulated the notion of shifting the burden of proof within the
plain error context completely on its own. 27 5 No one briefed the issue. No
one mentioned the idea at oral argument, and no one asked the court to take
the steps it took. Further, when the majority formulated its decision, no other
jurisdiction represented a model for it to follow. 276 Yet, the court resolved to
shift the burden of proof anyway, for reasons that had little to do with the
parties themselves. 2
To understand the majority's decision, it is important to understand
the specific controversy that was in front of the court. The controversy
involved whether the court should apply the plain error doctrine when
reviewing claims of unobjected-to prosecutorial error. 278 The majority stated
that recent case law made it clear that the plain error doctrine applies to
claims of unobjected-to prosecutorial error.279 It was also clear that the plain
error analysis, as defined by Griller, places the burden of proof on the
defendant to show prejudice in all cases of unobjected-to error. 280 To
illustrate, the court places the burden of proof on the defendant in cases
involving unobjected-to errors related to jury instructions, hearsay, the
274

See, e.g., id. at 303-04 (P. Anderson, J., concurring) ("In essence, this case is

about how we as an appellate court go about doing our business.... [Without briefs and welldeveloped arguments from the parties,] I believe it is imprudent for us to adopt the burdenshifting change adopted by the majority.").
273
See supra notes 122-126 and accompanying text.
276 See State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 306 (Minn. 2006) (Gildea, J.,

concurrin q)
"

See id. at 301-02 (majority opinion).

Our new approach of shifting the burden to the prosecution to show lack
of prejudice in prosecutorial misconduct cases best serves policy
concerns. The benefits of this approach are to better allow substantive
review of conduct that prosecutors should know is clearly forbidden and
to put the onus on the prosecution to defend against the prejudicial effect
of its own misconduct.
Id.

Id. at 296.
See id. at 301; see also Appellant's Brief and Appendix at *5, * 17-18, State v.
Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006) (No. A04-1056), 2005 WL 4829521.
280 See State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn. 1998); see also State v.
278
279

Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 582-83 (Minn. 2005) (hearsay); Bernhardt v. State, 684 N.W.2d
465, 475 (Minn. 2004) (Confrontation Clause violations); State v. Asfeld, 662 N.W.2d 534,
540-42 (Minn. 2003) (references to past domestic abuse); State v. Manley, 664 N.W.2d 275,
283 (Minn. 2003) (failure to provide a limited instruction regarding the use of certain
evidence); State v. Budreau, 641 N.W.2d 919, 925 (Minn. 2002) (references to past murders);
State v. Lee, 645 N.W.2d 459, 466-67 (Minn. 2002) (admission of evidence pertaining to
relationship between defendant and homicide victim); State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 685-87
(Minn. 2001) (Spreigl testimony); State v. Bauer, 598 N.W.2d 352, 363 (Minn. 1999)
(improper expert testimony); State v. Patterson, 587 N.W.2d 45, 52 (Minn. 1998) (narrative
testimony); cf. Appellant's Brief and Appendix at *10-14, State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294
(Minn. 2006) (No. A04-1056), 2005 WL 4829521.
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Confrontation Clause, expert testimony, Spreigl testimony, references to past
murders, past domestic abuse, instructions that limited consideration of
evidence, narrative testimony, and relationship evidence. 28 The defendant,
represented by the Minnesota State Public Defender, admitted the court had
used plain error analysis since the court decided Griller,8 2 but he asked the
court to abandon the plain error test. 283 The defendant asked the court to find
that when a defendant fails to object to prosecutorial error, the appellate
court must grant a new trial unless the error's effect on the jury was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.284
The fact pattern in Ramey is remarkably straightforward. The
prosecutor's statements in Ramey, albeit poorly chosen and improper, do not
shock the conscience. The details of the case do not touch any hot-button
social issues of the day, e.g., racial bias or cultural stereotyping,285 that could
cause great prejudice. For these reasons, Justice Gildea responded quite
reasonably to the majority opinion by arguing that there was nothing
compelling about the case that should have inspired an abandonment of the
principle of stare decisis. 8 6 Furthermore, Justice Paul Anderson responded
quite reasonably when he rejected the Ramey majority's opinion in favor of
his view of judicial restraint, which envisions a process by which the court
adheres to precedent, sends signals to practitioners in dicta that invite
arguments in the future on the issue, and then waits patiently until those
issues arise within actual controversies.2 87
D. The Minnesota Supreme Court Should Adopt the Term
"ProsecutorialError"
With only one exception,2 8 the Minnesota Supreme Court uses the
term "prosecutorial misconduct" to refer to all errors committed by the
prosecutor, from intentional misconduct that may "shock the conscience" to
unintentional slips of the tongue. As others have stated, the term

281

See supra note 280 (citing cases in which the court applied plain error analysis

to alleged unobjected-to error).
282
Respondent's Brief, State v. Ramey at *10, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006) (No.
A04-1056), 2005 WL 4859274.
28' Id. at *6.
24

Id.

285

See generally William E. Martin & Peter N. Thompson, Judicial Toleration of

Racial Bias in the Minnesota Justice System, 25 HAMLINE L. REv. 236, 269 (2002).
286 Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 304 (Gildea, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe majority's new
plain error formulation ... ignores the doctrine of stare decisis and creates unprecedented law
without compelling reason.").
287 Id. at 303-04 (P. Anderson, J., concurring).
288 See State v. Pendleton, 706 N.W.2d 500, 509 (Minn. 2005) (one use of the term
"prosecutorial error" accompanying discussion of "prosecutorial misconduct"); see also State
v. Washington, 725 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (using the term "prosecutorial
error" within discussion of "prosecutorial misconduct").
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"'prosecutorial misconduct' as a legal term-of-art seems to overstate the
case.''89 As the Connecticut Supreme Court explained in April 2007:
Prosecutors make countless discretionary decisions under
the stress and pressure of trial. A judgment call that we later
determine on appeal to have been made improperly should
not be called "misconduct" simply because it was made by a
prosecutor. To label what is merely improper as misconduct
is a harsh result that brands a prosecutor with a mark of
malfeasance when his or her actions may be a harmless and
honest mistake. 29
The authors recommend using the term "prosecutorial misconduct" only in
situations in which the prosecutor's conduct can be described as "intentional
or wanton wrongful ...behavior" or "deliberate or wanton violation of the
standards of conduct by a government official. 291 In situations where the
prosecutor's conduct may be harmless or an honest mistake, which includes
many of the "prosecutorial misconduct" cases previously cited in this article,
the term "error" seems more appropriate. Shifting away from the term
"prosecutorial misconduct" is not unprecedented.
In the 2007 Fauci case, the Connecticut Supreme Court abandoned
the term "prosecutorial misconduct" and opted for the term "prosecutorial
292
impropriety" to refer to all incidents of violative behavior by prosecutors.
Many other courts throughout the country use the term "prosecutorial error"
or another term-sometimes interchangeably with the term "misconduct"to refer to conduct that Minnesota courts would label as "misconduct., 293 For
289
290
291

See Kingrey, supranote 33.
State v. Fauci, 917 A.2d 978, 982 n.2 (Conn. 2007).
Dictionary.com, Misconduct, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/

misconduct (last visited Feb. 9, 2008).
292 See Fauci,917 A.2d at 982 n.2.
293
See, e.g., Ferguson v. State, 814 So. 2d 925, 946 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000) (using
term "prosecutorial error"); State v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 1184 (Ariz. 1998) (using terms
"prosecutorial misconduct" and "prosecutorial impropriety" interchangeably); People v. Hill,
952 P.2d 673, 684 n.l (Cal. 1998) (using term "prosecutorial error" because "the term
prosecutorial 'misconduct' is somewhat of a misnomer to the extent that it suggests a
prosecutor must act with a culpable state of mind"); Simpson v. United States, 877 A.2d 1045,
1048 (D.C. 2005) (holding that prosecutor's improper introduction of fact not in evidence was
"prosecutorial error"); Garcia v. State, 622 So. 2d 1325, 1331-32 (Fla. 1993) (using terms
"prosecutorial misconduct" and "prosecutorial impropriety" interchangeably); People v.
Nevitt, 553 N.E.2d 368, 380 (I. 1990) (using term "prosecutorial error"); Stephenson v.
State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 482-85 (Ind. 2001) (using terms "prosecutorial impropriety" and
"prosecutorial misconduct" interchangeably); State v. White, 109 P.3d 1199, 1210 (Kan.
2005) (holding that prosecutor's misstatements of law during closing argument was
"prosecutorial error"); Epperson v. Commonwealth, 197 S.W.3d 46, 61 (Ky. 2006) (holding
that alleged improper statements by prosecutor did not constitute "prosecutorial error"); State
v. Hampton, 750 So. 2d 867, 877-78 (La. 1999) (using term "prosecutorial error" to describe
prosecutor's misstatement of law to jury); State v. Lemar, 483 A.2d 702, 704 (Me. 1984)
(using term "prosecutorial error"); Giddins v. State, 878 A.2d 687 (Md. 2005), affd, 899 A.2d
139 (Md. 2006) (using term "prosecutorial error"); Commonwealth v. Coren, 774 N.E.2d 623,
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example, in 1980, the Wisconsin Supreme Court referred to a prosecutor's
misstatement, "made in the exercise of good faith and professional
judgment," as "prosecutorial error. ' '294 The term "prosecutorial error" is a
preferable label for most improper prosecutorial conduct because it is a
conceptual analogy to "judicial error." As for the term "prosecutorial
misconduct," it is reasonable to retain the term but to use it only for
especially egregious instances of deliberate wrongdoing. 9 5
State v. Mayhorn is a good illustration of why the court needs to
adopt the term "prosecutorial error" for unintentional errors. 296 In Mayhorn,
coincidentally a case decided two weeks before Ramey, the trial court
erroneously admitted evidence that the defendant had engaged in a prior
gunfight. 19 During the prosecutor's closing argument, the prosecutor
referred to the gunfight several times. 98 Upon review, the Minnesota
Supreme Court ruled that it was errorfor the trial judge to have admitted the

630 (Mass. 2002) (referring to improper statements during prosecutor's closing argument as
"prosecutorial error"); State v. Crews, 923 S.W.2d 477,482 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
prosecutor's remark that defense counsel acted like "magician" in distracting jury from facts
did not rise to level of "prosecutorial impropriety"); Rowland v. State, 39 P.3d 114, 119 (Nev.
2002) (prosecutor committed "prosecutorial error" when he vouched for witness); State v.
Little, 645 A.2d 665 (N.H. 1994) (using term "prosecutorial error"); State v. Bey, 610 A.2d
814, 847 (N.J. 1992) (prosecutor committed "prosecutorial error" when he improperly
downplayed significance of age as mitigating factor in death penalty case); State v. Mitchell,
543 S.E.2d 830, 841 (N.C. 2001) (referring to improper statements by prosecutor as
"prosecutorial error"); State v. Williams, 794 N.E.2d 27, 52 (Ohio 2003) (using term
"prosecutorial error" to describe prosecutor's injection of most emotional aspects of crime
into closing arguments); Commonwealth v. Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069 (Pa. 2001) (using terms
"prosecutorial error" and prosecutorial "misconduct" interchangeably); State v. Beltre, 764
A.2d 190, 191 (R.I. 2000) (using terms "prosecutorial error" and "prosecutorial misconduct"
interchangeably); State v. Big Head, 363 N.W.2d 556, 563 (S.D. 1985) (using term
"prosecutorial error" to describe prosecutor's misstatement while examining witness); Stahl v.
State, 749 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (using term "prosecutorial misconduct"); State
v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1242 (Utah 1993) (referring to prosecutor's inadvertent but
improper presentation of testimony as "prosecutorial error"); In re Personal Restraint of Pirtle,
965 P.2d 593, 603-04 (Wash. 1998) (using terms "prosecutorial misconduct" and
"prosecutorial error" interchangeably); State v. Jenich, 288 N.W.2d 114, 122 (Wis. 1980)
(referring to prosecutor's misstatement, made in good faith, as "prosecutorial error"), modified
on other grounds, 292 N.W.2d 348 (Wis. 1980); Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384-85 (Wyo.
1992) (using term prosecutorial "error" to describe improper comments by prosecutor).
294 Jenich, 288 N.W.2d at 122. In Jenich, the Wisconsin court distinguished the
concepts of "prosecutorial misconduct" and "prosecutorial error." Id.
295 See, e.g., State v. Harris, 521 N.W.2d 348 (Minn. 1994) (reviewing conduct of
prosecutor who improperly exploited evidence that several prosecution witnesses had been
placed in county's witness protection program because they feared defendant and elicited
inadmissible character evidence that defendant planned to beat his wife with a baseball bat);
see also Jenich, 288 N.W.2d at 122 (referring to prosecutorial misconduct as conduct
motivated by bad faith or a desire to harass or prejudice the defendant).
296 See State v. Mayhorn, 720 N.W.2d 776 (Minn. 2006).
297 Id. at 783.
298

Id. at 786.
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evidence,299 but the court determined that it was misconduct for the
prosecutor to have referred to the same evidence admitted by the trial court
because the prosecutor's statement "capitalized on and compounded the
court's error" and "appears to have been intended to inflame the passions and
prejudices of the jury., 300 There is no reason why a trial judge's good faith
decision should be mere error but the prosecutor's good faith decision should
be misconduct. Such terminology is especially disparaging to prosecutors
when the prosecutor was doing exactly what the trial judge permitted the
prosecutor to do.
Unlike the Ramey majority, which does not discuss the wide range of
impact that different types of improper conduct can have on a trial, the
authors believe that there is a significant difference between relatively
innocuous errors, e.g., an incidental one-line vouching statement such as "the
State believes X is credible," and serious, deliberate, intentional misconduct
in closing argument. The following excerpts represent statements prosecutors
have made in closing argument that should constitute "prosecutorial
misconduct":
" But is there any doubt in your mind as to what Dr.
Hagberg's opinion was, as to what caused that tear?
There's no doubt in my mind it was caused by sexual
intercourse at a time when she wasn't emotionally
prepared, namely at a time when she was unconscious..
. .Dr. Hagberg has an opinion . . . .And I have an
opinion. And I am sure that you have an opinion as to
what caused that tear . . . . And that ... satisfies me
beyond any reasonable doubt that [the alleged victim]
had been raped.3 °'
* None of us are safe until we take care of these people
who will rob, who kill, murder, steal .... You people
work. You work at your jobs. You raise your family....
Perry - he doesn't work. He prowls at night like he was
doing - downtown drinking from early afternoon until
late in the night; carrying this gun; target practicing in
his house.... When Arthur Robert Walters was lying on
that pavement dying . . . [h]e went up to Elmer's and
started to consume some more liquor and pursued his
299

Id. at 783.

300

Id. at 786; see also id. at 785 ("The fact that the prosecutor made repeated

references to the shoot-out is important to our conclusion that the combination of evidentiary
errors and prosecutorial misconduct rendered the trial unfair.") In addition to this error, the
court in Mayhorn discussed other, more egregious examples of prosecutorial error.
Considering that Mayhom had been decided just two weeks before Ramey, the authors of this
article suspect that the Ramey majority still had Mayhorn on its mind when it criticized the
"prosecutors [who] persist in clearly proscribed conduct." See State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d
294, 301 (Minn. 2006).
301
State v. Schwartz, 122 N.W.2d 769, 773 (Minn. 1963).
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particular indulgence at that time. This is not the class-A
citizen who is deserving of any consideration from
people on the jury. 302

"

If she is not guilty, why does the State not know that and
why do they prosecute?
Now, there is also another question there, how
actually does the State feel about this. We think it is a
very, very important case, and if we didn't think it was a
very important case we wouldn't be here on this trial.
We feel we know she is guilty. We spent considerable
money. We sent police and sheriffs to Chicago.
McDowell said they went to every town between here
and Chicago trying to look for that money. It has cost a
lot of money to try this case, and don't you think for one
second that we don't
know she is guilty or that money
30 3
wouldn't be spent.

"

*

[Jiust as surely as she has killed her husband in cold
blood, that same thing will happen to her son, or
someone else if she is released. So, ladies and
gentlemen, I submit to you that we have an additional
responsibility in this case, not the usual responsibility to
save society from this woman, but we have a
responsibility to that little boy you saw testify in this
courtroom, and... I feel as I have never felt before, that
the only way you can adequately discharge that
responsibility is to find this defendant guilty of murder
in the first degree. °4
I say to you, gentlemen of the jury, that I have a right, if
a man's story is improbable, to say that he is lying. Now
I might make a wishy-washy argument here and say he
is mistaken, but that is not what I believe, gentlemen,
that is not what is established, for I know, by God, this
man Crumley sat there and told you a deliberate framedup falsehood... I say it now and I would say it if I live
to be a hundred years old.

.

.

. I am telling you,

gentlemen, really from the bottom of my heart these
things about these detectives, because I knew, because I
felt, not as an experienced prosecuting attorney, because
I have only been such since last May, not as an
experienced criminal lawyer, because I have never been
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State v. Perry, 142 N.W.2d 573, 579 (Minn. 1966).
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State v. Gulbrandsen, 57 N.W.2d 419,421-22 (Minn. 1953).
State v. Schabert, 15 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Minn. 1944).
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such, but because
I claim to be a man of some small
30 5
intelligence.
Admittedly, these quotations have been cherry-picked to demonstrate a
contrast and are isolated from their contexts, but they reveal a species of
argument that is obviously more egregious than the statements found in
recent cases such as Ramey. It only seems fair to distinguish the two types
using two different terms: "prosecutorial error" and "prosecutorial
misconduct."
IV. A REPRISE: THE REMANDED RAMEY
The Minnesota Supreme Court remanded Ramey to the court of
appeals to determine whether the prosecutor's conduct constituted plain error
and to follow the new plain error standard it had established. 3° On May 1,
2007, the Minnesota Court of Appeals separately considered the four
statements noted in Ramey. 30 7 First, the court determined that the prosecutor
did not commit misconduct when he stated, "[tihat would be a big
coincidence if it wasn't the defendant, and the State believes that would be
too big of a coincidence. The State believes that's too big of a bridge to
jump. ' 30 8 Citing to Blanche, the court agreed with the State that "the 'State
believes' phrasing was a verbal tic that did not convey the prosecutor's
personal opinion to the jury." 3° 9 Second, the court found no misconduct
when the prosecutor stated in rebuttal, "[w]e suggest there [is] no evidence
that you can find that [Sherry Smith] was somehow affected, that she
couldn't have - couldn't have accurately identified Ramey's voice. 310 Citing
to State v. Bradford, the court31 held that the statement was "clearly not an
injection of personal opinion." ' Third, without explicitly noting whether the
statement was plain error, the court determined that the statement, "the State
charged Mr. Ramey, enter[ing] the trial believing he's guilty," which was
made during the prosecutor's opening statement,3 12 was not improper
because the State showed there was "no reasonable likelihood that the
State v. Bernstein, 181 N.W. 947, 948 (Minn. 1921).
State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 303 (Minn. 2006).
307 State v. Ramey, No. A04-1056, 2007 WL 1247145, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
May
1, 2007); see also Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 297 n.1.
308 Ramey, 2007 WL 1247145, at *2.
309 Id. (citing to and summarizing State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 375 (Minn.
2005), as "rejecting [the] argument that phrases such as 'I suggest to you' and 'I think' were
improper personal opinion, and quoting the district court's conclusion that these were
'rhetorical idiosyncrasies"').
310 Id.
311 Id. at *3 (citing to and summarizing State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 799
(Minn. 2000), as "holding that 'I submit to you' argument was not a statement of personal
opinion"). 312
See State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294,
297 (Minn. 2006) (suggesting that
this
statement was made during the state's closing argument).
305
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absence of this statement would have had a significant effect on the
verdict."313
As for the fourth statement, however, the court did find prosecutorial
misconduct when the prosecutor said, "The State believes [the victim's]
testimony is credible. The officer's testimony is credible, and you should
believe what they told you.' 314 The court determined that there was
misconduct because the jury could have interpreted the prosecutor's
statement as vouching for the reliability of the witness's identification of the
defendant's voice and for the credibility of the police officers who testified at
the trial.315 The court explained:
In a very short trial in which the reliability of one witness's
testimony is the critical issue, a prosecutor's argument
vouching for the credibility of that testimony must be
assumed to have had some impact .... Given the brevity of
the phone call, S.S.'s identification of the caller was
certainly less than overwhelming evidence .... If the call
had lasted significantly longer, and included references to
the relationship . . . or if it had been traced . . . then the
evidence would have been "overwhelming," depriving the
misconduct of any significant effect on the verdict. As it is,
however, the state's evidence was not so strong as to
diminish 316
the impact of the prosecutor's vouching
statements.
The court then reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial for Ramey.317
This court of appeals' opinion is unpublished, and, as such, the court
is expected to apply the law without needing to provide a lengthy discussion
of the law.318 The Minnesota Supreme Court traditionally is the proper court
to define and clarify the law, and "[u]npublished opinions of the Court of
Appeals are not precedential.,, 31 9 The 2007 Ramey opinion provided a wellreasoned and helpful explanation for why the prosecutor's fourth statement
constituted reversible plain error; yet, the court's opinion would have been
more helpful had the court explained in more depth when the phrase "[t]he
320
State believes" is only a "verbal tic" versus when it is improper vouching.
Further, the court's discussion of the prosecutor's first and second allegedly

314

Ramey, 2007 WL 1247145, at *3.
Id.

315

id.

316

Id. at *4 (citation omitted).

317
318

Id.

313

See MINN. STAT. § 480A.08, subd. 3(c) (2006) (describing the factors the
Minnesota Court of Appeals may consider when determining whether to publish a particular
case).
319 Id. Of course, published court of appeals opinions can and often do establish
new law. See id.
320
See United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 756-57 n.10 (6th Cir. 1979)
(distinguishing proper and improper uses of the words "I believe").
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improper statements would have been more helpful had the court
distinguished statements such as "the State believes" and "we suggest to
you" from those found in Prettyman, Ture (2004), and Blanche, where the
Minnesota Supreme Court suggested that a prosecutor's use of phrases such
as "I think," "I wanted you to see," and "I suggest to you" were error. 321 In
the future, Minnesota appellate courts should distinguish proper uses of the
phrase "[t]he State believes" from improper uses of the phrase so that trial
judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys know how to conduct themselves.
Bess, Fauci, and Reed are good models for any court to use when seeking to
distinguish between proper and improper conduct because they are both
informative and helpful for practitioners.322
V. CONCLUSION
In Ramey, the Minnesota Supreme Court's frustration over issues
related to prosecutorial error reached a breaking point, and a majority of
justices decided to do something bold about it. Collectively, all of the
justices were upset over the court's prior lack of success in reducing the
frequency of prosecutorial error at the trial level.323 The court had dealt with
issues of prosecutorial error many times before, and the justices felt that
prosecutors-or at least the "prosecutors [who] persist in clearly proscribed
conduct"-were not listening to them. 324 Under these circumstances, the
321

See supra Part III.A.2.c.

322

See supra notes 222-235 and accompanying text.
See Minnesota Supreme Court Oral Arguments - Videos, supra note 68. Justice

323

Paul Anderson appears to have spoken for the court during the Ramey oral argument when he
stated:
[Y]ou can take a look at a series of cases out of our court going back well
before Salitros. Salitros was kind of an expression of frustration on our
court, Portera little bit, too, as to... The court had said in cases before,
'We've seen a number of repeated instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
We said don't do it. No reversal. Don't do it. No reversal. And the
Why shouldn't [we], when we see it, apply the
behavior continues ....
highest standard and if... we do ... grant a reversal? Cause that's when
it will stop. Because... if you look at cases out of this court over the past
few years, there have been some repeated instances of prosecutorial
misconduct and the court has expressed its frustration to don't do it but
then has been reluctant to reverse. But if it is so limited, why shouldn't we
have the highest standard and reverse? Because then obviously it will end.
Our frustration will end because we'll be applying that high standard.
Id. Not only can one sense the court's frustration in Justice Paul Anderson's words but also its
desire to take a stand against prosecutorial error. But see infra note 324.
324 State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294, 301 (Minn. 2006). The court in State v. Ray,
659 N.W.2d 736, 746-47 (Minn. 2003), identified one particular prosecutor from Hennepin
County who faced three separate appellate challenges for statements he made in closing
argument that highlighted the fact that the defendant came from a "different world" than the
jurors. See also State v. Robinson, 604 N.W.2d 355, 362-63 (Minn. 2000); State v. Brown,
No. C7-99-1711, 2000 WL 978756, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 18, 2000). By identifying this
specific prosecutor, the court seems to have been attempting to imply that the same prosecutor
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majority in Ramey resolved to appropriate the plain error test, a doctrine
originally intended as a limited safeguard against obvious injustice,325to fix the
systematic problems for which it felt prosecutors were responsible.
This article has focused on a number of Ramey's problems. The
majority's decision was weakly justified because it relied on inapposite case
law and the mistaken notion that prosecutors have received clear guidance by
the court on what constitutes permissible and impermissible conduct. It was
not helpful to trial courts because it discourages defense attorneys from
objecting to prosecutorial error, and it violated the ideals of judicial restraint
because it broke from the Griller precedent without a compelling reason to
do so and with no input from the parties. 326 In addition, now that Ramey has
become the law, the new standard has not improved the court's ability to
identify and define prosecutorial error.327 For these reasons, the Minnesota
had made the improper argument in Ray after being warned twice by the appellate courts to
avoid the rhetorical device. See Ray, 659 N.W.2d at 746-47; see also Beth Hawkins, Trial By
Color, CrrY PAGES, June 4, 2003, available at http://citypages.comldatabank/24/1174/
articlel 1286.asp. A glance at the trial dates in Ray and Robinson, however, indicates that the
trials of the two defendants concluded before any of these three opinions was released. See
Margaret Zack, St. Paul Man Convicted of Drug-RelatedMurder, STAR TRiB., June 19, 1998,
at 2B (reporting that Dameion Robinson was convicted of first degree murder during an
aggravated robbery on June 18, 1998); Margaret Zack, 20-Year-Old Guilty of First-Degree
Murder, STAR TRIB., Nov. 11, 1999, at 3B (reporting that Secundus Ray was convicted of
aiding and abetting first degree murder on November 10, 1999). Further, the court actually
found no misconduct in the prosecutor's statement in Robinson and, in 2007, used Robinson to
exemplify proper prosecutorial conduct. See State v.Wren, 738 N.W.2d 378, 392 (Minn.
2007) (juxtaposing the proper comments found in Robinson and the improper comments
found in Ray). Thus, based on these three cases, any implication that this particular prosecutor
had been "persist[ing] in clearly proscribed conduct" would be wrong.
3
See Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 303.
326 This article does not discuss the inevitable social, financial, and emotional
costs of Ramey, but significant burdens arise when the court orders a second trial, not the least
of which are the burdens placed on victims and other witnesses who must spend time, money,
and emotional capital preparing for, waiting for, and testifying at a second trial. Of course,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and trial judges also bear responsibility for trying the case a
second time.
327 See, e.g., State v. Dobbins, 725 N.W.2d 492, 511 (Minn. 2006) (finding that the
prosecutor did not commit plain error when the state asked a series of "Are they lying" type
questions when referring to the testimony of witnesses during cross-examination of a
defendant who "holds the issue of the credibility of the state's witnesses in central focus"). In
Dobbins, four justices found that the prosecutor's conduct was acceptable because the
credibility of the witnesses was in "central focus," id., whereas three dissenting justices
adamantly disagreed, finding that "[a]sking one witness to opine on the veracity of another
witness calls for impermissible speculation, lacks foundation and is, at best, argumentative"
and that the conduct violates Rules 401 (excluding irrelevant evidence), 403 (excluding
relevant evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the possibility of
unfair prejudice or confusion), 602 (requiring that a witness testify only about matters shown
to be within her personal knowledge), 701 (restricting opinion evidence by lay witnesses), and
702 (requiring foundation for expert opinion evidence) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence,
id. at 514-15 (Hanson, J., dissenting). Dobbins illustrates that the justices also have been
struggling to identify prosecutorial error as well. See generally State v. Wren, 738 N.W.2d
378, 393 (Minn. 2007) (holding that while prosecutor engaged in misconduct, the defendant
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Supreme Court should overturn the Ramey decision and return to the Griller
plain error test when reviewing instances of unobjected-to prosecutorial
error. Regardless of whether the court retains or overturns Ramey, the court
should spend more time clarifying what constitutes prosecutorial error
because this will assist prosecutors in avoiding, defense attorneys in
identifying, and trial courts in remedying incidents of prosecutorial error.

did not meet his burden to show plain error); State v. Davis, 735 N.W.2d 674, 681-82 (Minn.
2007) (finding prosecutorial misconduct did not affect defendant's substantial rights); State v.
Fields, 730 N.W.2d 777, 786 (Minn. 2007) (finding no misconduct); State v. McArthur, 730
N.W.2d 44, 54 (Minn. 2007) (finding no misconduct); State v. Haynes, 725 N.W.2d 524, 530
(Minn. 2007) (finding no plain error); State v. Broden, No. A05-1584, 2007 WL 2601425, at
* 1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2007) (holding prosecutorial misconduct was plain error and that
state established the misconduct did not have a significant effect on the outcome of the case);
State v. Alameda, No. A06-1085, 2007 WL 2473489, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2007)
(finding no misconduct); State v. Lorenzo, No. A06-521, 2007 WL 2244902, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Aug. 7, 2007) (finding no plain error); State v. Dickson, No. A05-2460, 2007 WL
152086, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 23, 2007) (finding no plain error); State v. Cox, No. A06555, 2007 WL 2034214, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 17, 2007) (finding no misconduct); State
v. Olayiwola, No. A06-417, 2007 WL 2034161, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. July 17, 2007) (finding
no plain error); State v. Opelt, No. A06-996, 2007 WL 1599022, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. June 5,
2007) (holding prosecutor did not engage in prejudicial misconduct and that prosecutor's
statements did not prejudice the jury verdict or deprive defendant a fair trial); State v. Sivixay,
No. A05-2416, 2007 WL 1120566, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2007) (finding no plain
error); State v. Tabaka, No. A05-1899, 2007 WL 1120523, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 17,
2007) (holding there was no reasonable likelihood that prejudicial misconduct had a
significant effect on the jury's verdict); State v. White, No. A05-1828, 2007 WL 446606, at
*1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2007) (holding misconduct was not plain error, and even if plain
error, there was no significant effect on the case); State v. Simons, No. A05-2121, 2007 WL
329137, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 6, 2007) (finding no misconduct); State v. Carruthers, No.
A05-1763, 2007 WL 92668, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2007) (finding no plain error);
State v. Giishig, No. A05-2199, 2007 WL 92699, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2007)
(holding misconduct was improper but not unduly prejudicial); State v. Griffith, No. A052326, 2007 WL 92733, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2007) (finding no plain error); State v.
Johnson, No. A05-2238, 2007 WL 3514, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2007) (holding the state
met its burden of showing prosecutorial misconduct did not cause prejudice to defendant); In
re Welfare of B.U.P., No. A05-2443, 2006 WL 3593040, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 12,
2006) (holding there was no misconduct and no plain error); State v. Denzer, No. A05-2024,
2006 WL 3593021, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2006) (finding no plain error); State v.
Weidell, No. A05-1536, 2006 WL 3198904, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2006) (holding
plain error was non-prejudicial and did not warrant reversal).
The court of appeals has reversed one case due to unobjected-to prosecutorial error
after Ramey; however, in that case, the judges strongly disagreed about whether the state met
its burden in the third prong of the plain error test. See State v. Campbell, No. A06-250, 2007
WL 1470116, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 22, 2007) (reversing, in a 2-1 decision, for
prejudicial error, finding that "[tihe prosecutorial misconduct, which the state [failed] to
demonstrate did not effect appellant's substantial rights, required reversal for a new trial in the
administration of justice") (footnote omitted); see contra id. at 6 (Dietzen, J., dissenting)
(maintaining that the prosecutor's statements during closing argument, although plain error,
were not prejudicial because "the state [met] its burden of establishing that [its] conduct did
not materially undermine thi fairness of the trial") (citing State v. Fields, 730 N.W.2d 777,
782 (Minn. 2007)).

